

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.696
9 February 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Alessandro Vattani

(Italy)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 696th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a welcome in our midst to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, His Excellency, Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, who will be the first speaker today. Before his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs His Excellency Mr. Dembri occupied very senior State posts: he was, in particular, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Secretary-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to Canada and Greece. His presence in our midst today is proof of the sustained interest of his country in the cause of disarmament and the importance it attaches to our forum. I am certain that his statement will be followed with keen interest by the Conference.

Aside from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Romania, Ukraine and Australia. I intend to hold a brief informal meeting immediately following this plenary meeting, to be devoted to an exchange of views on an important and urgent subject. This informal meeting will be held in the presence of the members of the Conference alone. I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria to make a statement.

Mr. DEMBRI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and express my satisfaction that the work of this body is being guided by a distinguished representative of Italy, a country with which Algeria has ties based on common history and geography. I wish you every success as you carry out your duties and assure you of the full cooperation of the delegation of Algeria. I welcome the presence of His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as that of his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and his staff, whose dedication and professionalism make a major contribution to the success of the work of the Conference.

In addressing you today, I have come to testify to the importance attached by Algeria to the work of this body and to tell you of our concern to contribute effectively to the overall disarmament effort. The threats to the stability of certain regions, the rise and exacerbation of factors contributing to ethnic and religious intolerance, as well as terrorism, have been added to long-standing and still unresolved crises and the burdens caused by the maintenance of considerable stockpiles, including stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. By rejecting doctrines that rely on the balance of terror, we can more readily base our choice on a genuine struggle for peace. In its overall approach Algeria places all its trust in multilateral action in the field of disarmament. Here, in Algeria's view, is the appropriate context for cooperation and trust among States.

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

On 12 January last, Algeria deposited its instruments of accession to the Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, thus confirming that it uses nuclear energy for strictly civilian purposes. In addition to being an act of faith in the non-proliferation regime, this accession confirms a well established policy as regards the use of the atom, under which Algeria has from the outset voluntarily placed its research and radio-isotope production facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also testifies to our determination to contribute to the successful conclusion of the NPT review and extension Conference next April and thus to join an increasingly universal approach to nuclear non-proliferation. These are among the many reasons that have led us to address responsibly and frankly the uncertainties which could prevent the success of the Conference.

The effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime is dependent on its universality. With the current number of States parties, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the disarmament instrument that is most widely accepted by the international community. It plays the role of a buttress against proliferation and facilitates cooperation amongst States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, and in order to attain universality, it is appropriate to take the necessary steps to encourage even broader accession and to correct the imperfections in the Treaty and its imbalances. The non-aligned countries, including those in this forum, have regularly repeated legitimate expectations along these lines. The results shown by the four preceding review conferences should be considered in depth. We believe that it is high time to honour the commitments entered into by the nuclear States, in particular the commitment to introduce decisive disarmament measures. The delay so far undoubtedly calls the validity of these commitments into question and jeopardizes the structure built around the treaty. We believe that it is high time to do justice to the States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option by rapidly drawing up a legally binding international instrument against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Finally, all signatories should be guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology. Next April's Conference cannot be reduced to no more than a debate on the extension of the NPT. It should also be an opportunity for joint examination of the type of action required to restore the true vocation of the Treaty, that of a disarmament instrument which promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Algeria has been participating actively in promoting Africa as a denuclearized zone. We hope that the last obstacles to this undertaking will soon be removed and that the nuclear-weapon States will respect the future status of the continent once the treaty comes into force. We might recall that this objective, set more than 30 years ago by the Organization of African Unity, has become attainable since South Africa put an end to its military nuclear programme - a very significant and welcome gesture. It is high time that Israel followed suit so as to bring closer the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The universal dimension of the non-proliferation Treaty cannot suffer any limitations. The Arab countries have already made their contribution to the non-proliferation regime by acceding to the Treaty and working for the promotion of the Middle East as

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Hence they expect Israel to make an equivalent commitment by acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime.

The state of the negotiations on the nuclear-test-ban treaty leads us to think that the Conference on Disarmament will not manage to conclude its work before the Conference for the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons next April, as demanded by the non-aligned countries, nor before the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as hoped for by the Government of Japan. If this is so, how can we maintain the momentum brought about by the negotiations on the nuclear-test-ban treaty and ensure that the Conference on Disarmament succeeds in concluding its work within a reasonable time-frame? This question is all the more relevant in so far as the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have more or less remained a dead letter since 1968. Algeria hopes that an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty will be concluded as soon as possible. We believe that this is a realistic goal, given the encouraging progress made last year under the energetic guidance of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and the chairmen of the working groups. We hope that the negotiations will continue in the best possible climate. We are aware that the establishment of interconnected monitoring systems is vital to the viability of the regime. Algeria could, at the appropriate time, consider making available to these systems its seismological and atmospheric radioactivity monitoring stations in the context of the networks proposed. We expect that the nuclear-weapon States will show their commitment to further progress by refraining from new experiments and agreeing to endorse the proposals made by the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those regarding the universal and comprehensive scope of the prohibition and the structure and methods of operation of the organization responsible for the implementation of the treaty.

Last year the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Special Coordinator and entrusted him with holding consultations on the manner in which negotiations might proceed towards a convention on fissile material. The adoption of such a convention would undoubtedly constitute a decisive phase in the process of nuclear disarmament. Consequently, we believe that this endeavour should take place in its proper context. Discharges of highly enriched uranium and plutonium occurring as a result of the process of nuclear disarmament, the unauthorized burial of radioactive material, clandestine trade in fissile material and the acquisition by certain countries of undeclared nuclear capabilities clearly demonstrate that the international community cannot fail to give serious consideration to the question of existing fissile material stocks. We do not consider a ban on production in itself to be sufficient. We think that the question of existing stockpiles ought to be taken into account. The ad hoc committee which there is now consensus on establishing should be given a mandate taking into account the real need for disarmament and not just a selective reduction of the risks of non-proliferation. In this way it should focus its work from the outset on setting up a monitoring system based on transparency and universality.

(Mr. Dembri, Algeria)

It is true that in overall terms the end of the cold war has made it possible to ward off the risks of a world war, to bring about some improvements in the attitudes of States as regards their own security, to open up new prospects for disarmament and arms control. However, peace and stability call for continuous efforts, and this includes our Mediterranean region. For its part, Algeria pursues its regional approach within the framework of efforts to prevent and allay sources of tension. Whether it be for the settlement of the Western Sahara question, in the Sahelo-Saharan region, in the Maghreb or in the Mediterranean region, our actions are based on the patient building of focuses of peace, consultation and cooperation. Through this resolute policy, Algeria is participating in the collective effort to settle international disputes and eliminate sources promoting friction and an arms race in its immediate environment. Another illustration of this approach is the implementation of the process of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention, an instrument brought about by the collective efforts of the members of this Conference, which is now a landmark in the field of disarmament as regards both the range of the areas it covers and the mechanisms that it establishes.

At the domestic level my country has the difficult task of rooting a young and ambitious society in progress and modernity through a pluralistic democracy, promotion of the components of national identity, an economy open towards the world and the realization of ideals of justice, peace and development. It is within this context that Algeria is resolutely struggling against violence and terrorism, both their manifestations and their causes. This struggle stems from the obligation to guarantee, in pride of place among human rights, protection of the fundamental right to life, as well as the determination to establish irrevocably the mechanisms that should serve as a basis for a democracy, the most precious legacy we will leave to future generations.

In sharing these thoughts with you, I would like to convey to you the message of our hopes and our certainty as regards the role that could be played and the contribution that could be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the efforts of the international community as a whole to bring about peace, cooperation and harmony among peoples. You may be assured that, to this end, the delegation of Algeria will continue to make its full contribution to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka. As we are all aware, this is the last time that Ambassador Tanaka will address our Conference before leaving Geneva after an impressive tour of duty. Not only has Ambassador Tanaka served his country with distinction but he had also played an active and effective role at

(The President)

key moments in the Conference's negotiating history. I would cite Ambassador Tanaka's involvement in the final stages of the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention. More particularly, the members of this Conference will remember with gratitude the way in which he skilfully conducted the consultations which led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with its present negotiating mandate, the subsequent intensification of its work, and which we all hope will soon lead to the completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to extend our best wishes to Ambassador Yoshi Tanaka and his family and wish them every happiness in the future. I should now like to give the floor to Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, thank you very much for these very warm words extended to me. When I took the floor at this year's first plenary of the Conference on Disarmament last week, I congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency and expressed my confidence in your leadership. I should now like to congratulate you on your success in achieving agreement on the Presidential statement on the organization of the work of the Conference and getting its substantive work under way. I reiterate my confidence in your able leadership and assure you of the full cooperation of the delegation of Japan. I heartily welcome His Excellency Mr. Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, who has just addressed the Conference.

As it is only a few days before I shall leave Geneva, I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. It was in April 1992 when I arrived here to join those who had been working so hard to conclude the chemical weapons Convention. The success in totally prohibiting one category of weapon of mass destruction impressed the world with the competence of this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. While addressing such issues as a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, negative security assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments, I have welcomed many new colleagues and seen off many good friends. Finally, the time has come for me to bid farewell to the Conference.

I am proud to have been a part of the Conference on Disarmament. The CD is a small world. In fashion and music circles, of course, CD has a different meaning. While those other CDs may be more popular, our Conference on Disarmament has played and continues to play a crucial role in the maintenance of the peace and security of the international community. It has given birth to such agreements as the partial test-ban Treaty, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, the biological weapons Convention and the chemical weapons Convention.

In 1993, I had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which had been re-established after a one-year interval. Although the Committee did not have a negotiating mandate then, I was able to encourage the Committee to enter into such discussions as might be found useful once we did move into a negotiating mode. History was made when the Conference agreed to negotiate a CTBT on 10 August of that year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Last year, substantial progress was made in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee conducted under the chairmanship of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico. In particular, the Working Group on Verification chaired by Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany succeeded in providing us with a concrete idea as to how the verification system should look, building on the really intensive work of the experts. That work has already resumed this year in an effort to further elaborate and refine the system.

As basic technical issues have generally been clarified, it is now time for us to engage in the sensitive parts of these negotiations, which require political decisions by CD member States. These issues include the scope of the prohibition, questions relating to the CTBT organization, including the composition and the powers of the Executive Council, the degree of intrusiveness and the decision-making procedure of on-site inspections, and those issues relating to the entry into force and duration of, and withdrawal from, the treaty. As my last endeavour in this Conference, I would like to urge my colleagues to redouble their efforts to overcome their differences and conclude a CTBT as soon as possible. I wish Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, the new Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, every success.

Among politically important issues, perhaps the most sensitive is the question of the scope of the CTBT. In the statement made by a senior official of the United States Government at the first plenary meeting of this year's CD session, the basic position of one major nuclear-weapon State was clearly expounded. From the Japanese point of view, what is of key importance is that the future CTBT be truly comprehensive. We must allow no exception to this rule, and should get rid of all possible loopholes. If we succeed in confirming this in the treaty text, it should be regarded as a major breakthrough in our negotiations and will no doubt facilitate the early conclusion of the treaty.

I should also like to briefly touch upon the issue of the fissile cut-off. In doing so, I am not implying that other issues such as NSA and TIA are not important. However, the cut-off is one such very important item in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We should not make ourselves choose all or nothing, but should seek steady, rather than dramatic, progress. The consultations on the mandate for the negotiations should not drag on endlessly. I hope that the difficulties will be overcome as soon as possible under the leadership of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, Special Coordinator on the topic, and that negotiations will commence in the Conference before long.

I said that I am proud of having been a part of the CD. I am not sorry that I have to leave Geneva before I see the conclusion of a CTBT and the commencement of the cut-off negotiations, as I am confident that both will take place. I leave these important matters in your hands, my colleagues. And I sincerely hope that at some point in the future I will hear you too say, perhaps with even a greater degree of satisfaction than mine, that you are proud of having been a part of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

In conclusion, let me thank my colleagues for their cooperation, friendship, encouragement and even criticism, for I value all these accorded to me. I should also like to thank the secretariat, headed by Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference, and in particular his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, the political officers, interpreters, translators and everyone else engaged in providing conference services, for their valuable contributions to the important work of this august body. Mr. President, dear colleagues, thank you and farewell.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and I wish him all happiness for the future. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Moser.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to congratulate His Excellency Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, on his important statement.

Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor at the time when you are in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Your talents as a diplomat offer us a guarantee of success in our work. To put it in the third official language of your host country:

(continued in Italian)

So it is with great pleasure that I convey my greetings to you in the Chair. I am convinced that, as the representative of the great nation to the South of the Alps, a diplomat of long experience who has served as Director-General at the Farnesina, you will skilfully direct the work of the Conference.

(continued in French)

Our esteem is also addressed to your eminent predecessor, Mr. President, His Excellency the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Sirous Nasser, for the exemplary way in which he discharged his duties during the previous term of the presidency of the Conference. We also thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, as well as all the members of the secretariat.

Everyone agrees that there are too many weapons in the world. The difficulties begin when excessive accumulations of weapons have to be located. The Conference on Disarmament would be the ideal forum to address all these problems, as long as it succeeds in solving the question of its expansion and acquiring that representativeness which is also expected from the conventions it draws up. Switzerland would be happy to participate in the Conference on Disarmament as a full-fledged member. Once we have become a member State we will find it easier to obtain the necessary appropriations better to support the purposes and the work of the Conference. The example of inspections

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

within the context of the United Nations Special Commission has shown that Switzerland has internationally recognized experts in this field. It is in this context that I address the Conference today.

In my delegation's view the Conference on Disarmament should address - and concern itself with - not only weapons of mass destruction but also so-called conventional weapons. Today the latter entail extremely serious security risks. Since the Ad Hoc Committee in the field of transparency in armaments, so skilfully led by Ambassador Boytha last year, was the only one to deal with the sector of conventional weapons, it absolutely must be maintained. At the same time, the group of governmental experts entrusted with the task of studying and improving the operation of the United Nations arms register must succeed in expanding this register in a realistic way. In this entire problem area we should take account of military stockpiles as well as national production.

The Swiss authorities wish to pay Ambassador Marín Bosch, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann and Ambassador Dembinski, a well-deserved tribute for the progress accomplished towards the drawing up of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban convention, particularly as regards the technical issues of verification and institutional issues. The groundwork has thus been laid to approach the substantive issues which require more political decisions. In this context Switzerland favours as comprehensive a test ban as possible. A general clause would be the most appropriate legal means to arrive at this goal. Exceptions authorizing certain types of nuclear testing might render the convention meaningless. Peaceful explosions cannot be distinguished from "non-peaceful" explosions as far as their effects are concerned, and therefore should also be prohibited. They have little practical significance but may have serious effects to the detriment of the environment. The development of "peaceful" nuclear explosives cannot be distinguished from the development of nuclear weapons. The test ban should be considered to be an important step towards nuclear disarmament. The verification regime should make use of a number of means of detection, among which seismological detection will have a central role, without neglecting the three other methods selected by the working group. This choice does not rule out the adding of other methods with experience, under an evolutionary approach. We will have to think jointly about the distribution of responsibilities between the States parties and the international organization entrusted with applying the treaty. Generally speaking, a balance will have to be struck to draw up satisfactory arrangements in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Swiss Federal Council has decided to contribute to the exploratory phase of GSETT-3 in the shape of a beta station. Essential to confidence in the convention, we believe, is the effectiveness of the international organization we are to create. At first glance it appears tempting to make use of IAEA for monitoring compliance with the convention. However, we should be aware that IAEA has another calling. The international monitoring system that we are contemplating is an innovation and there will be a need for special experts, as well as inspectors on an exceptional basis to conduct on-site inspections. The expertise of other organizations might also be required. The desired universality of this

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

convention should also be sought in the arrangements we shall draw up for its entry into force. For the same reasons, withdrawal from the convention should not be made too easy. What we need is to seek, for the rules governing entry into force, a formula which naturally ensures the commitment of the largest possible number of States, on condition that it includes not only the nuclear Powers but also all States with a nuclear capability and, in particular, the so-called threshold States. However, we should try to find a mechanism to prevent this entry into force from becoming dependent on the particular will of a State or group of States. In this regard too it is crucial for the success of these negotiations that the Conference on Disarmament should proceed to the expansion of its membership. Hence we are confident that substantial work leading to the conclusion of a convention on a comprehensive test ban can be accomplished in the short term. The adoption of certain fundamental decisions will be of crucial importance with a view to the NPT review and extension Conference in April-May this year. Within the same context it would be useful to resume work on the issue of negative security assurances, led last year in an inventive and open-minded spirit by Ambassador Guillaume, to whose efforts we pay tribute.

A fundamental step towards arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of production of fissile material for military purposes. We deeply regret that a mandate to negotiate such a convention within the context of this Conference has not yet been drawn up, and we believe that the controversies that have arisen concerning the content of this mandate should not be settled in an a priori manner but only in the negotiations on the convention themselves. We would like to thank Ambassador Shannon for the tireless efforts he has made within the context of his mandate.

The issue of the prevention of an arms race in space is closely linked to the set of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. My country wishes to see the adoption of specific measures that can effectively impede an arms race, while permitting the use of ballistic technologies for peaceful purposes.

Switzerland follows the work of the Conference on Disarmament with great interest. We wish the Conference a year brimming with progress and success, and we hope that it will be able to broaden its field of action in order to ensure arms control which is increasingly effective on the world scale.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair

(continued in Italian)

and I thank him too for his kind remarks made in the beautiful language of Dante.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, at the outset, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and let me wholeheartedly thank you for the way you have guided us at this very critical stage and secured at least the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee which is of foremost importance to all of us, i.e. the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I sincerely hope that the pending establishment of the other three ad hoc committees on prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments will be resolved speedily. Furthermore, I hope the CD will be ready rather soon to establish an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, to which my Government attaches the greatest importance.

In United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/70 - adopted by consensus - on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the CD is called upon to proceed to a new phase of negotiations, to negotiate intensively, as a high-priority task, and to conclude a CTBT without delay. My Government fully subscribes to this goal and is committed to the conclusion of such a treaty at the earliest possible date. Nobody will deny the importance of CTBT negotiations in the run-up to the NPT review and extension Conference. As Ambassador Ralph Earle of the United States declared in this forum a week ago, we should achieve as much progress as possible in the test-ban negotiations before that conference convenes in April. Spelling out what such progress could mean with regard to the substance of a CTBT, some key issues come to my mind such as scope and basic obligations, political issues in the area of on-site inspections, such as the relevant trigger mechanism, and the further elaboration of an international monitoring system based upon the results of the IMS Expert Group. I am confident that our newly appointed Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland, and the chairmen of the two working groups on verification and legal and institutional questions will organize the CTBT negotiations in such a way that substantive progress on outstanding treaty issues can be made prior to the NPT conference. As I take the floor for the first time, allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate Ambassador Dembinski on the assumption of his difficult task and to wish him all the best. Furthermore, I would like to assure you of my Government's support for inter-sessional meetings of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, within the framework of a consensus decision.

In this context I am gratified to hear that the IMS Expert Group started its work last Monday under the able guidance of Dr. Peter Marshall. I may recall that the verification Working Group managed to give this Expert Group a mandate on their work at the closure of last year's session so that the experts can pursue their work on safe grounds.

Fortunately one stumbling-block in the course of the CTBT negotiations has been removed: I need not repeat that the former United States position on the "right to withdraw from the CTBT 10 years after it enters into force"

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

had caused German concerns which were voiced by my delegation when the United States introduced that position last year. We therefore very much welcome the United States decision to withdraw its proposal.

My delegation strongly favours the speedy and smooth re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances are an issue of high importance to many countries. Failure to establish such a Committee on this subject could also be perceived as a wrong signal in view of the forthcoming NPT Conference. Furthermore, I hope that the ongoing discussions of the nuclear-weapon States on this question will come to a satisfactory result in the next weeks. This could further the work in the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, hopefully established at that time. We see the security assurances recently extended by some nuclear-weapon States to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as an important step towards progress in this field.

Germany deplores the discussions surrounding the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments. The adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 C on transparency in armaments by an overwhelming majority bears ample witness to the importance the world community attaches to this CD agenda item. Furthermore, the TIA Ad Hoc Committee is the only forum in which - at least to some extent - conventional disarmament issues are dealt with in the CD. On substances, the constructive and fruitful discussions in last year's TIA Ad Hoc Committee have already demonstrated the need for further work. We are also prepared to contribute to advancing this important issue by assuming the chairmanship of that Committee if the Conference on Disarmament is willing so to decide.

In this context, I would like to point out that the issue of conventional disarmament deserves greater attention by this Conference. Conventional armed conflicts have increased in numbers and in their disastrous impact on people directly involved. Security problems in certain regions of the world deriving from conventional armed conflicts have become too obvious. Therefore, I urge the Conference on Disarmament to immediately re-establish the TIA Ad Hoc Committee and to start work in this important field. United Nations General Assembly resolutions 49/75 N and O contain operative paragraphs which specifically call upon the Conference on Disarmament to deal with certain issues in this regard. In my delegation's view it is high time to consider the topic of conventional disarmament in a more comprehensive fashion than in previous years. To this end, a first step could be taken when reviewing the agenda of this Conference.

My Government also attaches great importance to the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" and favours the early re-establishment of the respective Ad Hoc Committee. Germany has continuously contributed to the work of the Committee, inter alia, by providing the valuable input of experts to advance insights in the subject-matters. We have advocated giving the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate and, in the absence of this, at least to focus on confidence-building measures trying to

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

reduce suspicions and mistrust by creating a cooperative climate in the peaceful use of outer space. Despite the constraints on delegations by important ongoing negotiations, we should also get down to work in this Committee.

Let me turn to another high-priority issue on our agenda, a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. For my Government, a fissile material cut-off treaty is a key building block both in nuclear non-proliferation and in nuclear disarmament. Failure to establish a cut-off ad hoc committee and to start negotiations very soon would damage the role of the CD as the only multilateral negotiating body relating to arms control and disarmament. Starting negotiations in parallel to the CTBT negotiations right now is feasible. Although CTBT negotiations are predominant, deliberations on a cut-off in a negotiating format will enable us to better understand the main problems related to such a treaty. To secure the quick start of treaty negotiations we should agree on a mandate of the ad hoc committee based on the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1993 adopted by consensus. In our opinion this mandate does not preclude any deliberation on the possible scope of such a treaty and we look forward to contributing to such a debate. I want to pay special tribute to the Government of Canada which hosted an informal workshop on questions regarding a cut-off convention. This workshop, which I had the honour to attend, clarified some issues and contributed towards reaching a decision on the establishment of a cut-off ad hoc committee. I look forward, Mr. President, to the outcome of the consultations of your Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Shannon, on the advisability of appointing a special coordinator. In my opinion, these consultations led by Ambassador Shannon should result right away in the establishment of a full-fledged ad hoc committee.

Despite numerous efforts the question of expansion of the CD membership unfortunately still stands unresolved. As we all know, the Conference on Disarmament will lose its credibility if legitimate requests for expansion of membership keep being disregarded. In principle, my Government therefore favours a solution that every State should become a member of the CD which presented a candidature. However, Germany supports every proposal which brings about a substantive and balanced expansion of the CD. A special coordinator on this question, yet to be appointed, can draw on the respective resolution adopted by consensus by the General Assembly.

In my delegation's view, the application for CD membership presented by the Slovak Republic is independent of the general issue of CD expansion. This candidacy must be dealt with in its own right. The former republic of Czechoslovakia was a CD member. The two succeeding States internally agreed that the Slovak Republic should have the right to take up the seat of the republic of Czechoslovakia. There is no reason why none of the successor States should be represented in this Conference. My Government therefore fully supports the candidature of the Slovak Republic to become a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): I welcome the presence of and express my appreciation for the statement made by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Mr. Mohamed-Salah Dembri, which testifies to the importance Algeria attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you - a distinguished representative of a great nation with which Romania enjoys a long tradition of friendly relations - on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that your outstanding diplomatic skills and experience will be of great help in discharging the special responsibility always entrusted to the first President of a CD session. Already, after tireless efforts you succeeded to bring about agreement on the agenda and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We still have, however, to solve some other important organizational problems. Please be assured that in all these endeavours you will have the full support of my delegation.

Allow me also to express our gratitude to Ambassador Sirous Nasser of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who served as President in an exemplary manner during the last part of the 1994 session. We shall enjoy this year, I am sure, as we did last year, the professional and efficient assistance of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and all members of the secretariat.

I want to avail myself of this opportunity to bid farewell and express best wishes to our colleagues who have recently left their posts here or those who are to leave us soon. We shall miss them. I am however looking forward to closely cooperating with their successors so that together with all the members of the Conference we will responsibly meet the expectations of our nations and the whole international community in promoting disarmament and increasing security for all. I fully share the hope expressed here that the year 1995 will be the year of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. I hope that this session will also be a session of promoting restraint and transparency in conventional arms.

The end of bipolarity has not diminished but augmented the need for radical and sustainable progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. Never before has there been more opportunity for universal cooperation towards this goal. As an integral part of preventive diplomacy aimed at securing international peace and stability, the disarmament process has become increasingly comprehensive. While addressing both global and regional requirements, it now covers not only nuclear and other mass destruction weapons but also conventional arsenals, as well as confidence-building and transparency measures.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Nuclear disarmament has registered unprecedented strides during the last period of time. Nuclear-weapon complexes are now dismantling thousands of warheads per year in the implementation of START agreements and a common United States-Russian decision was taken to begin a process aimed at the eventual submission to IAEA inspection of all fissile material no longer needed for defence requirements. The commitment indicated by the two nuclear Powers to expedite the process envisaged by START I and II, as well as the willingness of other nuclear-weapon States to contribute in this respect, are remarkable steps that will substantially enhance global security and stability.

At the same time, United States-Russian detargeting of their nuclear missiles moves the world away from the hair-trigger nuclear posture that has threatened the second half of our century. Steady efforts have also been deployed to assure the removal of nuclear weapons from the newly independent States. The historic trilateral agreement among the United States, Russia and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine is perhaps the most important achievement of these efforts.

In the field of chemical disarmament, there is indeed no precedent for the chemical weapons Convention as a global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral treaty, which provides for the elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. At this stage, we believe renewed efforts should be deployed to ensure the entry into force of and universal adherence to the CWC, as well as to prepare for the future implementation of this important legal instrument.

I am pleased to inform you that the Romanian Parliament unanimously ratified the Convention last November and the instruments of ratification will be shortly presented to the depositary. At the same time, measures pertaining to the implementation of the CWC have been taken, such as the establishment of the national authority and the preparation of a draft law on the enforcement of relevant provisions. A business community awareness seminar was held in Bucharest on 11 October 1994 which revealed the real interest of our chemical industry and trade people in the ongoing process.

Genuine implementation of the 1972 biological weapons Convention has been precluded so far by the lack of effective verification mechanisms guaranteeing international supervision of compliance. The special Conference of States Parties held last September in Geneva took important steps towards closing this loophole through efficient verification machinery meant to discourage any attempt to produce and use biological weapons. Thus, an ad hoc group of States parties to the BWC was established in order to consider appropriate steps, including possible verification measures and proposals to strengthen the Convention. Romania is ready to contribute to the success of elaboration by the ad hoc group of a verification regime which, in our opinion, should rely upon interweaving of different measures, i.e. data exchange, export controls, national technical means as well as routine and challenge inspections.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Positive steps have also been taken in order to reduce conventional arsenals, increase transparency in military activities and build confidence among States. Euro-Atlantic nations have contributed much in this respect by concluding the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, a cornerstone in the effort to overcome suspicion and mistrust. Its current implementation benefits the overall security balance and we need to maintain the Treaty's viability and integrity in order to achieve its fundamental goals.

The Romanian Government also underlines the important contribution that the "open skies" Treaty can make to building confidence and enhancing transparency. My country has already ratified the Treaty and resolutely supports its entry into force as soon as possible.

There are less than three months ahead of us to the Conference of the States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which will decide whether the NPT will continue in force indefinitely, or will be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. For 25 years this Treaty proved to be the primary normative foundation for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a milestone of global security and stability. Due to the NPT, for a quarter of a century there was no increase in the number of nuclear States, although pressures in the direction of proliferation were tremendous. Unique in terms of its great number of States parties, the NPT has registered more, significant adhesions since the 1990 review conference. We hope the Treaty will attract all the countries in the Middle East, as well as India, Pakistan and all the others that are still hesitating, so that the NPT can achieve fully its universal vocation.

Many other positive steps toward nuclear disarmament would not have been possible without the NPT. The conclusion of the INF and START agreements, the progress made so far in the negotiations on a CTBT, the clear perspective of an international halt to the production of weapons-grade materials and the recent return of North Korea to a responsible nuclear policy are only a few significant examples in this respect. Even more, the NPT has contributed much to the settlement of the nuclear issue that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. The recent accession of Ukraine and Belarus to the Treaty are most welcome steps and, at the same time, prerequisites for a sound European and global security environment in the years to come.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy among the States which have committed themselves to non-proliferation is another important merit of the NPT that has to be recalled.

While sharing the view that the Treaty should not be held hostage to solving other problems, yet we believe much work is to be done under a permanent NPT towards a CTBT, a fissile material "cut-off" treaty, a strengthened and strongly enforced safeguards regime with more powers to IAEA and a treaty granting positive and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Ready to pledge its full contribution for reaching these universal aims, Romania wishes to reiterate its entire support for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. In this spirit, my country

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

expressed the wish to associate itself with the European Union joint action on the preparations for the 1995 NPT conference, adopted last year, that aims at promoting the widest possible accession to the Treaty and at widening consensus on the objective of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in last year's General Assembly First Committee debates, reaching this objective will not only strengthen the effective implementation of the Treaty but will also speed progress towards the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

Promoting a steady policy aimed at strengthening security and stability at a regional and global level, the Romanian Government is deeply attached to the objective of preventing proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, as well as of conventional weapons under strict international control.

Strongly supporting the view that export controls are an essential lever for enforcing non-proliferation, Romania established the necessary mechanisms, procedures and lists of items, all similar to those convened within existing international non-proliferation regimes, including those in which it asked to be admitted. The trade in strategic items and technologies is now regulated by the Law on the Regime of Imports and Exports of Strategic Goods, adopted by the Parliament in November 1994. This law confirms the National Agency for Strategic Export Controls and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as the competent body for checking the observance of legal procedures. The activity of the Agency is coordinated by an Interministerial Council composed of representatives from nine ministries. Upon the advice of the Agency, the Council decides on granting export and import licences.

The export controls assumed by various multilateral regimes based on mutual confidence and common shared values are an important complement to the mechanisms for the implementation of existing international treaties since their activity aims at preventing proliferation from the supply side, while the treaties control mechanisms address rather the recipient one.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty is one of the paramount priorities of the international community in the field of arms control and non-proliferation. Within the 1995 political environment, a fresh momentum is gathering for renewed efforts toward the achievement of this long-awaited goal. We highly appreciate the decisions taken by the United States to extend the nuclear testing moratorium until a CTB treaty enters into force. While no linkage should be made between the completion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the NPT extension, decisive progress in the CTBT negotiations improves the environment for achieving the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

In order to attract the adherence of all States, a CTBT should be universally applicable and internationally and effectively verifiable. The international monitoring system basic elements that resulted during the December inter-sessional meeting of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee give us an idea of how these requirements can be met. Romania joined those who believe the IMS should rely upon four technologies: seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

and radionuclide. Further work yet remains to be done on defining the structure and objectives of the international data centre, as well as the concept of the future organization which will be designated to monitor the implementation of the treaty.

Let me take this opportunity to express our highest appreciation for the fruitful work that has been done by the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. At the same time, I congratulate most warmly Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland on his election to this important post and pledge my delegation's full support for all his endeavours aimed at achieving concrete results in drafting the CTBT. I am sure Ambassador Dembinski's outstanding diplomatic skills and experience will be of the greatest help in this direction.

While giving priority to the NTB negotiations we hope that this will not mean exclusivity and that an agreement will be reached soon for re-establishing other subsidiary bodies, namely the transparency in armaments, nuclear security assurances and outer space ad hoc committees, which will give us the possibility of deepening the debate on these very important issues.

As far as transparency in armaments is concerned, my delegation deems it completely abnormal that, taking into account the fact that during the last five decades conventional weapons were the only ones used in conflicts, thereby causing significant casualties and material damage, we now have on our agenda almost exclusively items concerning nuclear weapons. You may recall that at the last United Nations General Assembly session a great number of countries, including developing ones, insistently advocated the need to adopt measures for cutting down the illicit traffic in conventional arms and for related assistance. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has himself drawn attention recently, at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to the fact that openness and transparency in military matters is essential to enhance confidence and trust among States, to help dissipate suspicions, and to contribute to global and regional stability. We therefore believe that deepening the dialogue on TIA is a must for the Conference on Disarmament if this body wants to remain faithful to its fundamental goals.

Further progress in TIA will contribute greatly to confidence-building and security among States. The promotion of transparency would encourage prudent restraint in the arms trade and reduce misunderstandings and tensions caused by lack of information. It might therefore be useful to set up appropriate measures in order to ensure that countries could never again acquire arsenals that go beyond their needs for self-defence.

In furtherance of the proposal put forward by the President of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ion Iliescu, in June 1993, aimed at regulating arms transfers through a "code of conduct", as a first step towards an international treaty in this field, my delegation submitted on 17 May 1994 a draft code of conduct, circulated as document CD/1257. The draft was intended to stimulate the debate on establishing universal and non-discriminatory

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

principles and criteria to be followed by subscribing States in considering arms transfers. My delegation would be ready to continue working on this basis with other interested delegations.

Turning to another important issue, namely NSA, I would like to reiterate Romania's position that an arrangement in this respect should be premised upon a universal and legally binding international agreement providing for negative as well as positive security assurances that are global in scope, uniform and comprehensive and ensure the equality of all States renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties. At the same time, a search for a solution to the problem of security assurances should not leave aside the United Nations, entrusted by the international community with maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. Therefore, we favour the idea of a Security Council confirmation and extension - on a broader basis - of the commitments which were originally undertaken by the three nuclear-weapon States in resolution 255 (1968).

We hope the 1995 session will also register notable steps forward in the debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this respect, an open avenue could be that of confidence-building measures in space activities and the possible use of satellite observation by United Nations and regional bodies in order to improve crisis management and surveillance, verification of disarmament agreements and implementation of agreed CBMs. We deem the conditions are now ripe to put aside doctrinal debates and try to search areas of convergence on which palpable results could be achieved.

Before concluding, I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the decision to resume consultations on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. My Government maintains the view that it is now necessary to codify the cessation of the production of weapon-grade materials in a legally binding instrument which would reassure that world community that these materials are not being secretly produced or procured. I am confident that Ambassador Shannon's diplomatic talent and expertise will bring these consultations to early fruition and I pledge him my delegation's full support in his challenging endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, it is my privilege - speaking for the first time during this session of the Conference on Disarmament - to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency. Your skilful performance of these important and sometimes arduous functions was one of the crucial factors which enabled overcoming certain obstacles in the way of the resumption of the productive work of the Conference.

I have a special pleasure to address this body in the wake of Ukraine's accession to the NPT. This act crowned over two years of tireless efforts on

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

the part of my country and our partners in the negotiations in resolving the principal issues related to security assurances, compensation for nuclear weapons being removed from its territory and practical assistance in their dismantlement and destruction. In this respect I would like to draw your attention to CD document 1285 dated 21 December 1994 issued by our delegation together with the delegations of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which contains the text of a Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Similar assurances were given to Ukraine by China and France.

For Ukraine accession to the NPT has come as a result of its consistent policies aimed at realization of the goal of relinquishing nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR and thus acquiring non-nuclear status. It is appropriate to mention here that even before accession to the NPT Ukraine, in the vein of these policies and proving its reputation as a responsible agent of international relations, removed all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory - well ahead of schedule; it has also strictly abided by the coordinated timetable of the removal of strategic nuclear weapons. Last autumn Ukraine agreed to place its nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards. My Government has clearly expressed its readiness to become a part of the Missile Technology Control Regime and join the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

It is our sincere hope that Ukraine's accession to the NPT, bearing special significance on the eve of the Conference of the States parties to the Treaty, will have a positive impact upon the process of nuclear disarmament, will contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and will enhance global stability.

Within this context, we would expect the early ratification of START II by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and concrete steps to be taken by three other nuclear States in order to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, as well as achieving tangible progress on the number of important political issues on the CD's agenda.

This comprises inter alia the question of security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. We support those delegations which have spoken for the elaboration of a comprehensive and legally binding document to this effect and feel that the efforts of the Conference in this field should be redoubled in order to reach agreement on a formula acceptable to all parties concerned.

No less important is the issue of the cessation of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We deem it necessary to establish the corresponding Ad Hoc Committee which would be entrusted with the elaboration of the agreement on the unconditional cessation of production of all types of weapons-grade fissile material under efficient and objective control, applicable also to the storage and use of already existing stocks of fissile material.

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

In its resolution 49/70 the United Nations General Assembly defined negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a high-priority task. I would like to reiterate the unswerving support of my country for the work being carried out at the CD in order to achieve the above goal in the shortest possible time. We wish Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, recently appointed the Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, every success in his endeavours. We also hail with satisfaction the measures announced by the Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Earle, in his statement at the first plenary of this session.

On this occasion I would like to inform the Conference that the Ukrainian authorities - willing to contribute to the creation of the efficient international monitoring system under the treaty - have taken decision to give consent to the incorporation of Ukrainian seismic stations in such a system and their participation to this end in the GSETT-3 arrangements. Relevant information has been forwarded to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

Ukraine's vision of the CTBT is that of a treaty which is to ban - unconditionally and effectively - all types of nuclear tests in any environment by any country, including the verifiable closure of all nuclear test sites, without any exclusion.

We are convinced that all negotiations either actual or prospective within the cadre of the CD and beyond should be conducive to attaining the goal of universal and complete nuclear disarmament no matter how distant it seems at this moment.

The previous history of the Conference testifies to its ability to find appropriate answers to the most difficult questions in the area of arms control and disarmament. In this respect it is highly regrettable that the CD has failed so far to use its negotiating capacities and experience to reach consensus on the outstanding issue of its expansion which, in our view, has already transcended the domain of procedural problems calling into question the credibility of the CD as a major international forum. We expect that new momentum to this work will be given by United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/77 B which for the first time specifically addressed the issue of the expansion of the membership of the CD and urged the Conference to make every effort to reach a solution resulting in a significant expansion of its composition. We expect that this resolution will be taken due account of by the special coordinator who is to be appointed - hopefully, without unnecessary delay, with a clear mandate and taking into consideration the balance of interests of all regional groups of the CD - by you, Mr. President.

The enlarged composition of the Conference is essential not only for ensuring more representative participation in the negotiations on the CTBT, but also for the discussion of other issues on the CD's agenda which affect the interests of the countries whose number by far exceeds the CD's membership list. We think that this course of action would be especially appropriate

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

this year, the year of the United Nations' fiftieth anniversary which is also marked by so many events of crucial importance for the disarmament debate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of office. We have high confidence in your ability to lead us through the challenges we face in establishing an effective programme of work for the year, and I can assure you of my delegation's full cooperation. In particular, we note that the establishment of the CTBT negotiating mechanism is almost complete and has started work. We commend particularly your efforts in this regard.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my regrets at the impending departure of our colleague, the Ambassador of Japan. We wish him well. It is appropriate in a statement on CTBT, which this is, to recall Ambassador Tanaka's historic chairmanship of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 which launched the current negotiation. His great contribution will be remembered.

My delegation considers that at the start of its 1995 session, it is appropriate for us in the Conference on Disarmament to reflect carefully on the international community's expectations of us. All of the 1994 areas of work of this Conference were the subject of resolutions carried by the General Assembly and we would wish to see work started in 1995 in all of these areas. I do not believe, however, that any in this room would deny that the most precise expectations by far were those set out in the comprehensive-test-ban-treaty resolution, to which my German and other colleagues have already referred. The wholehearted endorsement of this resolution from every quarter was made absolutely clear by the historic decision of all five of the nuclear-weapon States to join in co-sponsorship for the first time.

We believe the time has now come to give this commitment concrete expression, and to grasp the equally historic - and quite possibly unique - negotiating opportunity which lies before us. This opportunity, if squandered, could easily slip from our grasp for some years, leaving only recriminations and regret at our loss of significant disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation advances which have been our objective for decades.

Allow me, Mr. President, to recall a number of the key elements of resolution 49/70, and to draw out some of the implications for us now as we make decisions on the approach we take to organizing our work for 1995.

Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution reminds us all that notwithstanding the desire of many delegations - including my own - to move faster than the Conference found possible in 1994, we nevertheless elaborated a rolling text of impressive scope by the year's end. Despite the clouds of

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

brackets, the obvious structural quirks, and the occasional yawning holes, a 114-page document generated in only 26 weeks of negotiation cannot be dismissed as an insignificant achievement for a multilateral negotiating process. It provides an invaluable basis and resource for the resumption of negotiations.

It also rests as a tribute to the positive and substantial engagement of many delegations, and to the leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. It reflects the unflagging efforts of Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski in leading their respective working groups, and of the Friends of the Chair operating in support of these efforts. It is a corporate achievement which gives my delegation - and should give the international community as a whole - confidence in the Conference's ability to deliver a final result.

Operative paragraph 2 called on the Conference to advance work in the inter-sessional period with a view to making substantial progress. Again, we were pleased to see some significant forward steps: we reached consensus on the incorporation into the treaty of four monitoring technologies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound), and found a large measure of convergence on important details of implementation. Policy issues in need of resolution have been more clearly defined and identified. Major progress was achieved in developing common understandings of technical issues relating to on-site inspection. My delegation believes this work has provided useful foundations upon which the Conference can advance rapidly in completing the text of the treaty's verification package.

Operative paragraph 3, with its call upon the Conference at the start of the 1995 session "to proceed to a new phase of negotiation", is one which particularly deserves our attention. There was an expectation in New York that the models which had served effectively in 1994, in the production of the rolling text, would need to make way in 1995 for new and more imaginative modes of negotiation. It was appreciated that full formal meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups, while efficient for collating material which both reflected and protected preferred national positions, might not necessarily be quite so effective in promoting productive negotiations towards closure on issues, and towards the compromises necessary to achieve this. Of course, this need for a change of gears is not a new revelation. It reflects the way in which the Conference has traditionally operated, including in the chemical weapons Convention negotiations, once it perceives that the end, while still at some distance, is at least in sight.

Consequently, I believe it accurate to say that the international community and many if not all delegations in this room are looking to 1995 as a year in which we apply a fresh impetus towards closure; a year in which we increasingly work as a Committee and working groups supported by smaller and less formal groups - appropriately coordinated so as to guarantee transparency of process. The time for set-piece debates on procedure or on terminology and the adding of yet more brackets has passed, and we need to assert this

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

fundamental fact in our work plans. 1995 is most assuredly not intended to be "business as usual"; there should be a new flexibility aimed at achieving results.

Following on from this, operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution were remarkably plain and to the point: the remit from the international community is for the Conference "... to negotiate intensively ... and to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty ...". The expectation - an expectation to which all of our Governments subscribed, many by way of co-sponsorship - was for negotiations which clearly demonstrate not only an intensity of activity, but also achievement in terms of a finished product, and this without delay. The same operative paragraphs point towards the levels of commitment which will be required by all delegations participating in the negotiation if we are to achieve this conclusion in 1995. Concluding the negotiations will require hard work by all delegations. It will require willingness to commit diplomatic resources to the staffing of positions within the Committee as required, and to supporting in good faith an increasingly multi-stranded and intensive effort, including a preparedness to work inter-sessionally.

It is also obvious that the progress we can make on certain important topics will reflect the degree to which the testing States can collectively agree to move forward. Leadership has already been shown, and more will be needed in the future to help us advance on the more persistent differences confronting us in the rolling text. In this context, the recent steps announced by the United States to extend its testing moratorium and to rescind its earlier "special withdrawal" proposal are particularly commendable, enhancing as they do the practical possibilities for consensus while at the same time confirming a deep and abiding commitment to the negotiation. Australia would wish to place clearly on record its appreciation of these decisions, as well as the continued suspension of testing by others among the nuclear-weapon States.

It follows from all of this that we need to give serious collective thought to precise negotiating strategies which will best achieve the shared and clear objectives to which we all subscribed in New York. There is of course no magic formula. There are, however, a number of ways in which we could organize ourselves and I would venture to highlight some basic approaches which, in the view of my delegation, would contribute to closure. First, in order to make further progress, in order to move decisively to the "new phase of negotiation", we need clearly to identify where the central issues lie in our somewhat unruly rolling text. In our view one could probably identify six topic-centred "clusters" of significant issues where we are yet to reach consensus. In rough order of importance, these appear to us to be scope, verification, organization, entry into force, review and amendments, and duration and withdrawal.

Second, it would seem that the differences between delegations on issues within these "clusters" are not readily amenable to resolution at the level of drafting. There are serious choices here requiring considered political

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

decision. Consensus may not readily emerge in open meetings of the Committee unless the Committee itself and its working groups is supported by an energetic and intensive programme of formal and informal consultations aimed at producing convergence. We would wish to avoid a stylised formal process where bracketed text is examined and re-examined but progress is minimal. Rather, we think that as in the case of previous negotiations, the Committee will be at its most productive if operating in tandem with intensive consultations pursued with the active blessing of the Committee and its working groups. At the same time, the Committee will need to highlight for Governments exactly what the issues are and what decisions are necessary in order to activate a productive negotiating process.

Third, it seems to us that we should be quite clear in our message to Governments and the international community that with these clusters resolved, we will be in reach of a completed treaty. Governments need to recognize that the time has come for making serious decisions to achieve convergence.

Finally, in order to respond to the General Assembly's call to direct our efforts towards concluding, and not simply negotiating, the treaty, we will need to have very considerable progress towards closure in most of these "clusters" by the end of the first part of our 1995 session. It is traditionally the first part of our annual session which provides the greatest opportunity for serious and sustained work. If we have not achieved marked progress by its end, we will truly have difficulty in reaching the desired goal of a completed treaty text this year.

While claiming no special insight, I should like also to offer brief observations on what my delegation sees as critical choices embedded in two of the clusters of issues I identified earlier. Amongst the legal and institutional issues, it seems to us that the question of scope is of considerable practical and symbolic importance. Progress here is fundamental to overall achievement. Lack of movement could be seized upon as evidence of deadlock. Here perhaps more than elsewhere, it seems obvious that there is a limited political envelope within which we can construct a treaty article. The maintenance of positions towards the extreme ends which disregard the political realities of the negotiation - and possibly our negotiating mandate - will increasingly be seen as incompatible with a serious commitment to closure.

All delegations are committed via the mandate to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In our view there is patently little support for complicating the negotiation by broadening the scope to include explicit bans on computer simulation and laboratory procedures. At the other extreme, we believe the international community as a whole will simply not accept the concepts of nuclear explosions for peaceful or exceptional circumstances; nor can we see the international community entertaining ideas we have seen reported for the acceptance of nuclear explosions under a CTBT with tons - some mention hundreds of tons - of explosive yield. We do not see such

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

views exercising meaningful leverage on the final text of a treaty. We hope all delegations in coming to this realization find themselves in a position to move towards the middle ground and consensus positions sooner rather than later.

In the field of verification, we are looking to move smartly to consolidate and extend upon the real progress achieved at the end of 1995. We are confident that the international monitoring system Expert Group, currently meeting under the able chairmanship of Dr. Peter Marshall, will provide the technical convergence and input necessary for us to finalize drafting of key parts of the verification protocol. We believe significant and concrete textual advances should be possible in the relatively near future. However, on the level of verification policy, a series of important questions will need to be resolved in order to make further textual progress. These include how we will fund treaty verification facilities; to what degree verification data will be processed and analysed by the CTBT organization prior to distribution; how precisely we will handle the modalities of on-site inspection together with any necessary consultations and clarifications; and what data the CTBT organization may take into account. As elsewhere, intensive formal consultations may assist in precipitating a consensus which we feel is not that far off.

The task we are facing is a heavy one, and one which will place particularly heavy burdens on those holding office within the Committee. In offering my delegation's sincere congratulations to Ambassadors Dembinski and Ramaker for their election to chairmanship of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee and to the legal and institutional Working Group respectively, I would wish to convey to them Australia's appreciation of their willingness to take up these burdens on our collective behalf, and to assure them of my delegation's unfailing support in striving towards our common objective.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. We have exhausted our list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

If this is not the case, I should like to mention that, following the adoption on 3 February of the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session, certain pending issues remain to be dealt with. These relate to the appointment of a special coordinator on the review of the agenda and a special coordinator on expansion of membership, as well as the possibility of the re-establishment, as soon as possible, of the ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments, as well as any other ad hoc committees which may be agreed on following further consultations. I intend to spare no effort in ordering to bring about early agreement on all these pending issues so that the Conference can indeed put into effect all the provisions outlined in the Presidential statement.

(The President)

At my request, the secretariat has circulated a tentative timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As agreed, the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 February at 10 a.m. Before adjourning, I should like to remind you that we will be holding, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting which will be limited to the presence of members of the Conference only.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.697
14 February 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Alessandro Vattani

(Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 697th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It gives me great pleasure to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, His Excellency Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali, who will be addressing the Conference today. Before assuming his current position as head of Pakistan's diplomacy, the Foreign Minister served his country in many different capacities, notably as a member of the National Assembly, and as Minister of State for Economic Affairs. We are indeed grateful to the Minister for finding time in his very busy schedule to come and share with us the views of his Government on the important issues on our agenda. His presence among us today is a further confirmation of Pakistan's deep and abiding involvement in the multilateral approach to arms limitation and disarmament. I know that we will all be listening to the Minister's statement with keen interest. I should now like to give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, His Excellency Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali.

Mr. SARDAR ASEFF (Pakistan): I consider it an honour that the Conference on Disarmament has convened this session to enable me to make this statement.

I would like to extend to you, Mr. President, our warm felicitations on the assumption of your important office. I am sure the work of the Conference on Disarmament will benefit immensely from your long experience and deep commitment to the vital objectives which this Conference is seeking to achieve. I assure you of Pakistan's full cooperation in the discharge of your important responsibilities. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Sirous Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who guided the deliberations of the last session of the Conference with consummate skill and competence.

Pakistan has made active contributions to the quest for disarmament. Today, I have come to this body to emphasize our desire to play a constructive role in promoting peace, security and disarmament, globally and specially in South Asia. Although, in recent years, the world has changed dramatically, in many ways it remains disappointingly the same. The threat of a global nuclear holocaust has receded over the horizon. But the nuclear arsenals which will remain after the agreed reductions will be sufficient to devastate the planet. The dangerous stability of "mutual assured destruction" has been replaced by a less fearsome, but more uncertain, multipolar world; a world which is in rapid transition to an unknown destination. In short, an equally dangerous world. In this period, when history is moving ahead at lightning speed, agreements for the control of arms and for disarmament are required more than ever before, to diminish the dangers of the disputes which have surfaced, to reduce the consequences of the conflicts which have proliferated in so many regions of the world, to lessen the dangers of one country after another descending into chaos.

Unfortunately, history does not offer much encouragement for the noble aim of containing arms as a means of diminishing the danger or the suffering of conflicts and disputes among States. In the past, States have observed

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

the dictum: to avoid war, States must be prepared to fight it. And fight they have. Throughout history, disarmament has never been voluntary. It was always imposed by the victor on the vanquished. During the cold war, when the global arms race assumed entirely irrational proportions, all that could be achieved was a regulation of the massive proliferation of nuclear and conventional arms by the super-Powers and their allies. The build-down of these weapons commenced only once the cold war concluded.

The challenge confronting us today is to construct agreements for arms control and disarmament, not by imposing them on the defeated or weak, but by convincing each State that the restraint required would be in its own self-interest. But to realize this essential objective, the world community will need to vigorously address and resolve the underlying disputes, the roots of hostility and conflict between States. We shall need to ensure that imbalances in power and armaments do not encourage some States to resort to aggression, or seek domination, within or outside their regions. Above all, it will be essential to convince all States that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are not essential to preserve their security and independence.

The cold war is over. The rationale for the competitive build-up of nuclear arsenals no longer exists. Yet, sadly, the majority of the nuclear Powers are not prepared to commit themselves to ultimately giving up their nuclear weapons. These nuclear Powers make no promise that our world will, one day, be safe for our children, be free of nuclear weapons. In the present era, the basic question confronting the Conference on Disarmament is the following: Is our ultimate objective here to promote a world free of nuclear weapons? The answer, naturally, must be yes. This affirmative response should be expressed in a binding commitment by the nuclear-weapon States. In our view, such a commitment to rid themselves of nuclear weapons is an essential incentive, if not a precondition, for the realization of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control on a universal basis.

We are, of course, encouraged by the progress made in nuclear disarmament in recent years. The reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union, under the START I and START II agreements, will be unprecedented in disarmament history. Our optimism about the positive impact of these agreements is, however, tempered by the decision of the United States and the Russian Federation to retain the alarming number of 3,000 nuclear warheads each. When cold war competition has been transformed into a Partnership for Peace, the retention of such huge arsenals is, in our view, not justifiable. We will continue to work for general and complete nuclear disarmament. In this context, we attach special importance to the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. This Committee should begin negotiations as soon as possible to evolve a concrete and time-bound programme for nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are really two sides of the same coin. Nuclear non-proliferation gains its legitimacy as a goal because it is meant to facilitate the larger aim of nuclear disarmament. It was not the purpose of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty to divide the

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

world perpetually into States which possess nuclear weapons and others which do not. This Treaty was a transitional arrangement - initially for a period of 25 years - to enable the nuclear Powers to negotiate the measures for nuclear disarmament. The promise contained in article VI of the NPT, to promote nuclear disarmament, is not a concession by the nuclear-weapon States; it is an obligation which is at least as crucial to non-proliferation as the commitment of its non-nuclear parties to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.

It is not my purpose here to restate our views on the NPT - its inherent inequality; the non-fulfilment of the commitments contained in article IV and article VI of the Treaty; the absence of credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We are glad that, notwithstanding these shortcomings, the NPT has been ratified by an ever-growing number of States. Most of them believe that nuclear weapons are not relevant to the preservation of national independence. Some others were persuaded by the cold war alliance arrangements to forswear nuclear weapons. And the NPT has gained important adherents in recent years.

The NPT does not respond to Pakistan's security concerns and we deplore its discriminatory character. However, we favour the extension of the Treaty because we acknowledge that a breakdown in the NPT consensus would have negative implications for international stability. On the eve of the NPT review and extension conference, it is evident that the existing consensus regarding the Treaty is fragile. This consensus could unravel if it becomes obvious that the NPT is seen by its sponsors as a means to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. As the cold war security structures evolve and mutate, and the number of conflicts and crises proliferate across Euro-Asia, the world community will need to specially bear in mind the security concerns of those nuclear-capable NPT parties which have exercised commendable self-restraint. There is also a sense of unhappiness among many developing members of the NPT at the discriminatory treatment they receive. Some of them have rightly complained that their acceptance of the NPT has not removed the suspicion with which they are seen and treated. Their sense of frustration could erode the NPT consensus. In this context, the value of coercive options to promote non-proliferation that are sometimes bandied about should not be overestimated.

For over 30 years, Pakistan has advocated the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as a means of halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcomed last year's landmark decision by this Conference to mandate its Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate such a test-ban treaty. The treaty must be universal and non-discriminatory. We note with satisfaction the forward movement registered by the Committee and its two working groups under the experienced leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico.

The United Nations General Assembly has consistently emphasized the need to halt the production of fissionable materials and for the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks for peaceful uses. Pakistan is a party to this long-standing consensus on fissile materials. In 1993, the language of

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

the United Nations General Assembly resolution was modified with a view to securing the endorsement of two important States for the goal of banning fissile materials. This change in the language of the 1993 General Assembly resolution cannot be construed to preclude consideration of the problem of unbalanced stockpiles held by various States. To freeze the existing asymmetries in the level of fissionable materials will have significant consequences for the security of some States. A freeze alone will not contribute to nuclear disarmament nor to non-proliferation.

After lengthy discussions, Pakistan has decided to support the adoption of a mandate for the ad hoc working group based on the language of the 1993 United Nations General Assembly resolution. We are able to support this language because Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution. We will, however, seek confirmation from this Conference that this language does not preclude any delegation from raising the issue of the scope of the convention during the actual negotiations. In this context, we reserve the right to ensure consideration of the question of asymmetric stockpiles.

The NPT extension, the CTBT and the fissile materials convention will not address adequately the problems of arms control and proliferation in two sensitive regions of the world - the Middle East and South Asia. In the Middle East, the desire of Egypt and other regional States for parity and non-discrimination in the level of nuclear non-proliferation commitments is understandable. We fully support the goal of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone which entails equitable and non-discriminatory obligations for all the parties concerned.

Pakistan's fears about nuclear proliferation in South Asia were expressed as early as the 1960s. Our fears, and our proposals for comprehensive safeguards to ensure against nuclear diversion, were dismissed by the major Powers, including by an earlier incarnation of this body. Instead, after the May 1974 explosion of a nuclear bomb next door, it was Pakistan, not our neighbour, which faced the brunt of embargoes on peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Our response to the Pokharan nuclear explosion was to seek agreement for a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. This proposal had been advanced by the late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972. Since 1974, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed this proposal. In 1978, we proposed an Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing nuclear weapons. In 1979, we proposed reciprocal inspections by Pakistan and India of each other's nuclear facilities or simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards. The same year, we expressed our readiness to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) simultaneously with India. Later, in 1987, we proposed the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban treaty. In 1987, we also proposed the convening of a United Nations-sponsored conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. In 1991, Pakistan and the United States separately proposed the convening of a five-nation conference. All the proposed participants, except one, accepted this proposal. Last year, the United States proposed multilateral talks on security, arms control and non-proliferation in South Asia. The comprehensive approach of this

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

United States proposal offers a realistic mechanism to address the interrelated security problems of South Asia - i.e. regional disputes, conventional arms imbalance and the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. We understand that this proposal still remains on the table. We hope it will be pursued actively to obtain the endorsement of all the proposed parties.

I will not dwell on the Kashmir dispute in this forum, beyond stating that the key to agreements for the control of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia is a solution to this dispute; a dispute which poses one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. The imbalance in conventional arms in South Asia further heightens insecurity and tensions in the region. While such grave asymmetries exist, it will be difficult to realize the goal of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. Pakistan has advanced several proposals for conventional arms control in South Asia including for a mutually agreed ratio of forces. These proposals remain on the table. In this context, we welcome the adoption of a General Assembly resolution on "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels". The Assembly has requested this Conference to consider the formulation of "principles" which can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. This would be a more equitable and effective alternative to the purely supply-side strategies which seek "transparency" in conventional armaments.

There is not much time or space to arrest the danger of a wide-ranging and dangerous arms race in South Asia. Very soon, nuclear-capable short-range missiles may be produced and deployed by our neighbour, which is also developing and testing medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan will be obliged to offer a matching response. The warning time of a surprise air attack will be reduced to a few minutes. Pakistan continues to hope that South Asia can step back from the precipice of a dangerous arms race. Pakistan and India have been unable to resolve their problems bilaterally. Two major disputes were settled through third-party mediation. We need the help of our friends to address and resolve the festering disputes and security problems which loom dangerously over South Asia. Pakistan will be responsive to all initiatives and proposals which are consistent with the principles of equity and justice.

In this post-cold-war era, the most serious threat to peace and security can arise from efforts to impose dominance over the other States. In the current era, attempts by one State, or group of States, to impose their will on others have become increasingly unrealistic. International security will have to be built, and preserved, through a cooperative approach, and through the mutual accommodation of the national interests of all States, in various regions of the world. International peace and security will have to be based not, as in the past, on the acquisition of arms but, increasingly, on the control and regulation of armaments, globally and regionally, through the free consent of the States concerned, a consent based on enlightened self-interest. To this end, it is essential that the measures on which this Conference agrees to negotiate, and the substance of these measures, must respond to the national interests and the security concerns of all States, and not merely the large and powerful countries.

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

Pakistan will participate actively in this Conference to exploit the exciting opportunities which are now offered to build a stable structure of international security based on arms control and disarmament. Together with the United Nations Security Council, and the United Nations General Assembly, this Conference - the single negotiating body on disarmament - is called upon to play a vital role in the construction of this new architecture for collective security based on the vision of the United Nations Charter; a partnership for peace which is not restricted to one region or one continent but the entire world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, as this is the first time I take the floor while you are presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, let me express to you the congratulations of my delegation for the skill and wisdom with which you have steered the work of the Conference during the first part of the session which is generally difficult. We are happy to see you in the Chair as the representative of the friendly country of Italy and we will rely on your wisdom.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan has in his statement today made several points on which I would like to give our comments. The CBMs proposed by Pakistan are an obvious bid to cover up their discomfiture and embarrassment at the fact that their clandestine nuclear weapon programme stands exposed by their own admissions even by their own leaders. They have, however, been so devised that India cannot possibly accept them as they do not take into account our vastly greater defence responsibilities and in the nuclear field run counter to our position about the need to take into account the global reach of nuclear weapons and of not doing anything which would sanctify unequal treaties and the division of the world into "haves" and "have-nots".

A reference was made to the proposal on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Pakistan has been moving a resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia for the past several years while at the same time relentlessly pursuing its clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Now that there is overwhelming evidence regarding the true nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme, merely repeating the proposal at this stage must be viewed as a propaganda exercise and a tactic by Pakistan for diverting international pressure to give up its nuclear weapons programme.

India's views on the creation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones are well known. Given the global reach of nuclear weapons, it is illusory to seek security through regional arrangements, particularly where the security interests of all the concerned States are not taken into account in defining the region. That is why India has proposed an action plan for the ushering in of a nuclear-weapon-free world. India has always been and is prepared to enter into consultations with Pakistan or any other country to work for the

(Mr. Chandra, India)

implementation of our phased programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework, which includes commitments to be given by nuclear-capable countries not to cross the threshold.

We have, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, made repeated offers to Pakistan orally and in writing for a bilateral dialogue for across-the-board normalization of relations. This offer has been backed up by a series of detailed and far-reaching proposals, contained in six non-papers, including a number of disarmament-related CBMs which build upon existing arrangements and are designed to further enhance confidence between the two countries. It is notable that these proposals include, inter alia, measures for maintenance of peace and security along the LOC, creation of a zone of disengagement in the Siachen area in Kashmir, extension of the existing agreement on non-attack on nuclear installations and facilities to include population centres and economic targets, an agreement on no first use or threat of use of nuclear capability against each other, etc. Pakistan, unfortunately, has so far chosen to spurn the offer of talks and the proposals made by us which gives the lie to their contention that there is a threat to international peace and security for if there was indeed a real threat, it would not be natural to fail to encourage any bilateral talks and explore any proposals made to avert it.

Pakistan's response to the non-paper on CBMs unfortunately reflects a compulsion to link the subject to the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Pakistan has failed to appreciate that CBMs are incremental in approach and help in reducing tensions.

Pakistan's dismissal of the Indian proposal on no first use of nuclear capability on the grounds that it is "unclear" does not take into account the fact that India's proposal is predicated upon "intent" and its concept of capability does not indicate actual weaponization and thus our proposal is a viable step towards confidence-building. It is disappointing that the suggestions that we have made even with regard to improving communications between the Directors-General of Military Operations do not appear to find favour with Pakistan at this stage. We do hope that Pakistan will be more forthcoming because such communication links lay the basis for transparency and reduce mistrust.

Coming to the subject of the point that was raised by the distinguished Foreign Minister on inability to settle differences, the fact is that Pakistan is trying to internationalize the Kashmir issue by raising the bogey of a threat to international peace and security. Any such move would give a setback to the normalization process now under way in Kashmir by encouraging Pakistani-supported terrorists and exacerbate further India-Pakistan relations. Bilateralism and not third-party involvement offers in our view the best modality for the resolution of India-Pakistan differences. It is common knowledge that third-party involvement was tested and it was found wanting in the period right up to 1971: it failed to prevent three wars between the two countries and failed to undo injustice done to India by Pakistani aggression. Meaningful and lasting solutions to problems between neighbours are best found in the bilateral frame. The late father of the

(Mr. Chandra, India)

present Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was then President of Pakistan, had solemnly committed himself to such a course of bilateralism in the Simla Agreement. It is very significant that it is the Simla Agreement which, in the period from 1971 till 1990, was the one agreement which was able to promote a normalization of relations between the two countries. It has to be recognized that if there are differences between neighbours then they have to be resolved bilaterally. We are surprised that the present Pakistan Government has been trying to resile from this Agreement.

India is always ready to engage in bilateral talks between the two countries for across-the-board normalization of relations in accordance with the Simla Agreement. In this context, it is relevant to recall the statement made by Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister of India, on 31 October 1994: "Let me reiterate that we remain committed, as always, to a resolution of all outstanding issues in accordance with the Simla Agreement, and I once again call upon our neighbour to respond to our efforts to establish good-neighbourly relations. I shall always be ready and willing to meet and continue the effort to peacefully resolve whatever differences there might be between our two countries."

In addition, I would like to make two more comments. Firstly, it was stated that India exploded a nuclear bomb in 1974. That was not a nuclear bomb but a peaceful nuclear explosion. Since then we have shown tremendous restraint by not moving towards weaponization. Secondly, Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India whose accession to India in legal terms and by popular consent is unquestionable. The only question that remains is the vacation of aggression by Pakistan committed in this Indian State.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. The floor has been asked for by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. I give him the floor.

Mr. SARDAR ASEFF (Pakistan): It is not my intention to inflict any kind of controversy between India and Pakistan on this distinguished Conference. However, I have heard the distinguished representative from India very carefully and I would merely respond by saying that Kashmir is a dispute according to Security Council resolutions and we must go out of this log-jam that we have got ourselves into by not insisting again and again that it is not a disputed territory. That is what makes disputes intractable and insoluble. It is a dispute and it must be addressed and we are prepared to involve ourselves in meaningful negotiations for the solution of this dispute. And, regarding the six Indian proposals sent to us, we have not rejected them, we are prepared to talk only on the six non-papers sent by India. But before the six non-papers were sent to us, I wish the distinguished representative of India had cared to mention the fact that we too had sent two non-papers to India. As soon as both non-papers are brought on the table and as soon as India is prepared to talk on substantive issues with a political will to solve the problems, we are prepared to go into a peaceful dialogue - negotiations - to settle all our problems. But the necessary requirement for that is - the word I use is "requirement" not precondition, because where human suffering

(Mr. Sardar Aseff, Pakistan)

is concerned, where human rights are concerned, that is not a precondition - it is a requirement for the creation of a propitious atmosphere, an atmosphere in which the people of Pakistan do not feel that the negotiations and the talks are an exercise in futility; that India is serious about solving problems, and this requirement lowers the repression in Kashmir. And then bring all eight non-papers on the table. On nuclear disarmament, the United States of America has given a multinational, a multilateral proposal, which is a very useful proposal and it has the endorsement of many countries in the world. It has the support of many countries, many States. Why don't we agree to talk on the basis of that useful and very constructive proposal? With these few remarks, Mr. President, I thank you for your indulgence.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): I will be very brief. I share the sentiment of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan that we should not go into polemics. I would just like to make two simple points. First, the Security Council resolutions are very clear that vacation of aggression by Pakistan from Kashmir is essential.

The second point I wanted to make is that we have always been ready for bilateral discussions with Pakistan for across-the-board normalization of relations with that country, and I therefore do not see any problem in why there should be discussions between the two countries. This is what we have been saying and arguing for all along. There have been a series of communications from our Government to the Government of Pakistan and we do hope that they will respond favourably so that such bilateral discussions can be held to resolve all possible differences.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his remarks. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. But before doing so, I wish to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.698
16 February 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 698th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria and the representative of Myanmar. Allow me to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Wolfgang Schallenberg. We are grateful for the interest which Austria continues to show in this forum and I am sure we all look forward to hearing his statement with interest. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome in our midst the new representatives of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye, and Morocco, Ambassador Mohamed-Nacer Bendjelloun-Touimi, who is with us for the first time today. I should like to assure them of our full cooperation and support in their new functions.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, allow me to extend a cordial welcome to those representatives of the non-governmental organizations present today in the public gallery, who, in accordance with what has become a well-established tradition, will present to the Conference a message to celebrate International Women's Day. As you know, International Women's Day is normally celebrated on 8 March, but in view of the fact that the NGO community will be involved in the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen on that day, it was felt appropriate to take this opportunity to receive their message. I am sure the Conference joins me in extending our very best wishes to all the women present in the room today and saying how much we appreciate their constant commitment to peace and disarmament and their continued interest in our labours.

I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, who will read out their message to the Conference.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message reads as follows:

"Esteemed members of the Conference on Disarmament:

"We are honoured to be able to address you again this year, as we commemorate International Women's Day. Due to the World Summit for Social Development taking place in Copenhagen on the official date of International Women's Day, 8 March, we are having our women's gathering earlier this year.

"We, women from different countries and organizations, are gathering for the seminar on 'International security: A feminist perspective for the future'. We are focusing on security as it relates to environment, ~~development~~, international relations, disarmament and to highlight their interdependencies. A comprehensive strategy for peace from a women's perspective consists of a holistic approach to overcoming

2001-05-01

(Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

the varied and multiple forms of violence which plague human society and erode the basis of human security. The interests of human security can best be served by a transition from the culture of war, which now prevails, to a culture of peace.

"There is a vital link between people-centred development and the use of resources. As we approach the twenty-first century, women worldwide are appalled by the use of a large part of the world economic resources for the production and sale of weapons meant for destruction. We see global and complete disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons as essential for secure and sustainable development of societies. Therefore, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is of great importance to us and we support you in your efforts to conclude agreements that can make our lives and our planet safer.

"There are several topics currently under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament. One of which is the issue of the agenda. For the first time since 1978, the agenda of the CD has been brought into the spotlight for review, evaluation and possible expansion. We hope that the members of the CD take this long overdue opportunity to adopt an imaginative approach to meeting the needs of today's world. One such item to be considered would be the growing problem of anti-personnel land-mines and the use of conventional weapons in general. Women bear a heavy burden when conventional weapons are used, and are often left to pick up the pieces of the lives of those who survive. Land-mines pose a real hazard for civilians and humanitarian workers, so it is both practical and necessary to ban the development, use, transfer, manufacturing and stockpiling of such weapons. These types of issues should be considered in the work of the CD, and therefore we call upon the CD to contribute to the debate of this important issue.

"The testing, manufacture and use of conventional and nuclear weapons remain a deadly threat to people and the environment. Nuclear testing must be halted and the production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials banned. Many women and men around the world are anxiously awaiting the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and there was hope that this would be in 1995. A CTBT is desperately needed to prevent the development of new types of nuclear weapons designs and systems, as well as to stop the proliferation of these weapons. While certain issues need to be negotiated before a CTBT is achieved, total and complete disarmament has to remain the ultimate goal in any negotiations that take place.

"We are concerned that the nuclear-weapons States are missing the opportunities presented by the end of the cold war, and putting at risk the NPT and non-proliferation regime. START I and II and the INF have been significant achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, and we encourage the members of the CD to continue in this direction and ultimately fulfil their obligations under article VI for complete nuclear

(Mr. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

disarmament. It is time for new threat assessments, not for targeting new enemies, which take into account the health and environmental damage from past and future nuclear production, and the risks to life on Earth if nuclear weapons are used again. We applaud the vision which brought about the 1992 chemical weapons Convention, and urge the Conference on Disarmament now to pull together to conclude a CTBT this year. We would also urge the CD to begin negotiations forthwith on a nuclear weapons convention, banning production, stockpiling and acquisition, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons under international and environmental safeguards.

"The mobilization of public opinion around security and disarmament issues is essential. Non-governmental organizations can facilitate this process by using our global links to disseminate information and widen the debate. More involvement of women at all levels of decision-making, in NGOs, the United Nations and the CD delegations, is desperately needed. We would urge the Conference on Disarmament to consider enlarging the role of NGOs in the work of the CD. Our voices represent the voices of many women around the world who want to see a better, brighter future.

"This address to the CD comes at an especially appropriate time. As we remember with horror the beginning of the nuclear age 50 years ago with the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we anxiously await the end of this tragic era. Let 1995 be remembered as a crucial moment of history marked by the end of the nuclear arms race. The United Nations, now in its fiftieth year, is in the unique position to facilitate this transition. It is everyone's responsibility to work for a peaceful future. But we look to you, having a particular responsibility for disarmament, which is an essential component of the conditions for life to continue.

"We wish you every success as you take up this formidable challenge and again assure you of our full cooperation.

"Signed by: Hungarian Peace Association, International Peace Bureau, International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations, Swedish Peace Council, Third World Movement against the Exploitation of Women, War Resisters International, Women for Peace, France, Women for Peace, Geneva, Women in Black, Great Britain, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Women's World Summit Foundation, World Young Women's Christian Association."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for having read out the very significant message of the NGO community on the occasion of International Women's Day.

(The President)

Before giving the floor to the speakers inscribed today, I wish to inform you that it is my intention to suspend the plenary after listening to the speakers inscribed today, and to convene an informal plenary meeting immediately in order to consider the request from Viet Nam to participate in the work of the CD and take up again the issue which we started to consider at our informal meeting last Thursday, 9 February. This informal meeting will again be restricted to members of the Conference only.

I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Wolfgang Schallenberg.

Mr. SCHALLENBERG (Austria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of this Conference for the first part of its 1995 session. My Government is happy to see in this office the representative of Italy, a neighbouring country with which Austria maintains excellent and cordial relations. Your expertise as well as your spirit of pragmatism and conciliation are well known to all of us, and I am sure that you will be able to give our work here the impetus and guidance that is necessary in order to make progress towards our objective. I also wish to express the respect Austria has for the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky. Mr. Petrovsky is not only well known for his exemplary experience in the area of disarmament, but is also considered by my Government and by all of us as a good friend of Austria. Our delegation greatly appreciates the quality of work provided by the secretariat under his direction as well as that of his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

We are all well aware - as the United Nations Secretary-General also indicated, indeed, in his message addressed to the opening meeting - that this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament coincides with an historic moment for disarmament in general as well as for international security and stability. The Conference, so well known for its expertise, has always made in the past, and will continue to make in the future, major contributions to the solution of global disarmament problems. When I speak of an historic moment I am referring first of all to the fact that we find ourselves this year exactly 50 years after the end of the Second World War, after the first use of a nuclear weapon, after the founding of the United Nations and 50 years also after the liberation and restoration of the independence of Austria. To all this we can add the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, later this year, the holding of the review and extension Conference for this treaty.

As you know, Austria is a contracting party, as a non-nuclear weapon State, to the NPT. As such, Austria, like many other non-nuclear States, has assumed its share of responsibility towards the international community by renouncing not only nuclear weapons but also by submitting all raw materials or all special fissile products originating from any peaceful nuclear activity to the safeguards stipulated in an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. My country has also unilaterally given up the use of nuclear energy for electricity production, in keeping with the wishes of its people as expressed in a referendum on this subject. Hence Austria remains all the more

(Mr. Schallenberg, Austria)

convinced of the fact that only the NPT, and a universally accepted NPT, can stem nuclear proliferation and at the same time provide an appropriate context for progressive disarmament. Consequently, Austria appeals to all the countries that have not yet done so to accede to this treaty and thereafter to respect its obligations faithfully as well as to the contracting parties to extend it and continue to apply it. We consider this appeal to be legitimate in view of the obligations that Austria has assumed and our country's fundamental interest in a world in which the sovereignty, security and independence of a State are not endangered by the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is from this point of view that Austria has already spoken, and will continue to do so, in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Austria attaches a great deal of importance to this legally binding instrument, which has been seen to be very effective in the implementation of its objectives, remaining in force without any conditions or limits in order to be able to continue to contribute to international security.

All these thoughts have very close links with the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1995. My Government believes that the long-term success and credibility of such an indefinite and unconditional extension envisaged for the NPT will depend to a great extent on the progress made in other areas that are closely connected with non-proliferation itself. Allow me to mention two subjects that have pride of place on the agenda and programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, namely the nuclear test ban and the ban on the production of fissile material. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, in a statement to this Conference in 1988, and also the Austrian Parliament, have on many occasions spoken in favour of the speedy conclusion of a convention banning all nuclear testing in all natural environments. Such a ban would be an historic step towards renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons. At the same time, the effects on the environment caused by underground testing, which has not as yet been banned by the present partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty, could be reduced and even eliminated by such a convention. In the context of a future comprehensive ban on testing, Austria takes note with great satisfaction of the various national moratoriums that have been declared by nuclear-weapon States as well as the determination with which member States have said they will give absolute priority to this delicate subject.

A nuclear test ban would be seriously undermined if it was not subject to strict, precise, flexible and transparent verification measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has made considerable progress recently. The Ad Hoc Committee benefits from the advice of the technical experts and the practical experience acquired through simulation of elements of the future verification system and the international data centre. Allow me at this point to recall that last summer Austria formally submitted its offer to host this future organization and all its subsidiary bodies, including the international data centre, in Vienna. I have come to this forum to confirm this offer and assure you that the Austrian Government will do everything it can to facilitate the establishment of the new organization in Vienna. As several delegations have already emphasized, the future organization will be able to derive a great deal of benefit from proximity and close cooperation

(Mr. Schallenberg, Austria)

with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, it goes without saying that the Austrian offer at this stage does not prejudice in any way a subsequent decision with regard to possible links between the future nuclear-test-ban treaty organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Among the other issues that are of topical importance for this Conference, I wish to comment briefly on the prohibition of the production of fissile material. Austria regards this as a measure accompanying efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. An additional reason why Austria attaches special importance to this subject is the fact that it is surrounded by many countries that use nuclear energy intensively for peaceful purposes. Hence a special awareness in Austrian public opinion of all questions regarding nuclear safety. With regard to negative security assurances, I wish to emphasize that these could encourage a number of countries to opt for denuclearization and to take the non-nuclear route as far as weapons are concerned. With regard to outer space, I will confine myself to emphasizing the importance of this work for a country such as Austria, which for many years has been able to play a major role in the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Austria would like to restate its resolute support for any initiative that is designed to protect space from the dangers of an arms race.

To conclude my statement I wish once again to draw your attention to the subject of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Despite many initiatives, declarations, consultations, reports and official documents, this delicate problem has not as yet been resolved. On many occasions my country has not failed to emphasize the advantages that would result from its admission as a full member of this Conference. We believe our aspirations are supported by resolution 49/77 B of the United Nations General Assembly, which in its last operative paragraph requests this Conference to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of 1995, in a significant expansion of its composition. We have taken good note of the efforts that you, Sir, have been making in pursuance of this resolution, as well as your intention to arrange for the appointment of a special coordinator. I wish to emphasize to you that Austria is keeping this matter under firm scrutiny.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry of Austria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Mr. President, allow me first to extend our warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial time. My delegation is fully confident that your wealth of experience and expertise in the field of disarmament will be invaluable inputs to the work of the CD during your tenure of office. May I also pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Nasser for his able leadership during his presidency in the closing month of the 1994 session and the inter-sessional period? Colleagues attending this session have addressed

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

warm words of welcome to me, and I should like to reciprocate their kind sentiments. I look forward to entering into close ties of friendship and cooperation with them all.

The year 1995 is special from the point of view of arms limitation and disarmament. Not only does this year mark the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, but it will also witness in April the convening of the historic review and extension Conference of the NPT. This Conference is an event of such importance that the subject of the Conference and its related issues dominated the deliberations of the First Committee at the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, although it was not formally on the agenda of the Committee. The same applies to our proceedings here in the CD during the first part of this session.

There is no doubt that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains one of the foremost security concerns of the international community today, and that its prevention is a major challenge facing us. We should rightly accord the twin questions of nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons non-proliferation the highest priority on our disarmament agenda. My country is fully committed to, and strongly supports, the continuation and the further strengthening of the current regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the NPT and other related nuclear disarmament and arms limitation measures. Accordingly, we should like to see a successful outcome of the NPT review and extension Conference.

Following the conclusion of the cold war, fundamental transformations have taken place and are still taking place in the international political and security environment. We need to readjust and revise our security concepts in keeping with this new environment. During the era of the cold war, the security concept prevailing in the two opposing camps was confrontational. In the present context that confrontation has given way to cooperation. For this reason my delegation subscribes to a new concept of global, comprehensive and cooperative security. While internal security matters will remain within the competence of member States, security problems of global dimensions require a global response and should be viewed in the global context. This concept of security is comprehensive and multi-dimensional, covering the whole spectrum of strategic, political, military, economic, trade, social and cultural aspects. It is cooperative in the sense that security interests of the State or a group of States must not be attained at the expense of others, and that these interests should indeed be advanced by promoting the common security interests of all States in cooperation with one another.

Viewed from the vantage point of this concept, the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a global problem requiring a global cooperative response. There should exist no justification for parochial national policies of nuclear posturing by nuclear-weapon States. Nor is there any justification or relevance today for their continuing dependence on the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which are predicated on the early first use of nuclear weapons. It is in our shared common security interests that

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

nuclear-weapon States carry out their obligations for nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT and contribute to substantive progress towards the conclusion of a CTBT, a treaty banning fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes, and a multilateral legal instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It will also be in our comprehensive security interests that States parties to the NPT further promote their cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and technological development. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties, on their part, have the responsibility to adhere to their obligations under the Treaty. It will also advance our common and cooperative security interests if the remaining reluctant States overcome their regional differences and join the NPT to take us further down the road towards the universality of membership of the Treaty. In this context, we are happy to note, and warmly welcome, the recent accessions to the NPT by Algeria, Argentina, Ukraine and other countries.

At the conceptual level, the goal of nuclear disarmament is consistent with our concept of global, comprehensive and cooperative security. This concept underscores the need to reduce dependence by nuclear-weapon States on their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the present-day environment, the doctrines of nuclear deterrence have become more and more irrelevant; and nuclear weapons, under the current nuclear policies, have turned out to be overvalued currencies of power carried over from the cold war era. There exists a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons. By so doing, nuclear-weapon States will establish a powerful and effective political and moral barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I should, therefore, like to stress here that the time is opportune for nuclear-weapon States to rethink, review and revise their nuclear doctrines and policies in the light of present-day realities.

Undoubtedly the top priority of the current 1995 session of the CD is the intensive negotiation and speedy completion of the CTBT. By resolution 49/70, the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly calls on the CD to proceed to a new phase of negotiation. It further urges all States in the CD, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate as a high-priority task, and to conclude a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Accordingly, the CTBT being one of the crucial issues that will impinge on the outcome of the forthcoming NPT Conference, it is imperative that the CD complete, or largely complete, the draft CTBT by April this year. At the very minimum, we should like to see by April this year agreed texts on the scope of the treaty and on the principal issues of verification, and a commitment by all in the CD to finalize the draft treaty text before the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This means that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is required to resolve these basic issues in the course of the first part of this session. We have complete trust in the leadership and far-sightedness of Ambassador Dembinski; and we trust that, under his skilful chairmanship, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be able to produce timely results. We wish him all the best in his endeavours.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

I take this opportunity to welcome the positive initiatives recently announced by the United States delegation, namely the decision to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear tests until a CTB treaty enters into force, the proposal to extend the CD session if necessary, and the withdrawal of the United States proposal for a right to withdraw from the CTB treaty 10 years after its entry into force. We believe that these initiatives and proposals will help provide an impetus to substantive negotiation of a CTBT.

The production and stockpiling of fissile materials constitute a continuing danger to international security. A ban on fissile materials is fundamental to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have agreed in the CD that the CD is the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty banning fissile materials. There is also agreement that an ad hoc committee be established. A consensus draft mandate for the ad hoc committee has, however, eluded us. It remains our ardent hope that consultations, skilfully conducted by our Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon, will soon bear fruit by way of reaching a consensus mandate. My delegation takes the view that a ban on fissile materials requires the prohibition of the production of fissile materials usable for weapons and other nuclear explosive purposes, addressing in an appropriate way the issue of the existing stockpiles of fissile materials. A ban on fissile materials should be a nuclear-disarmament-oriented measure. It should not be merely a non-proliferation-oriented step. We believe that this basic concept should be reflected in the draft mandate of the ad hoc committee. Another important question is that of negative security assurances. The current international political climate is favourable to substantive progress in this area. Earlier on, I underscored the need to de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in the post-cold-war era. NSA and other restraints on the use of nuclear weapons are essential steps in the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. In this context, I am happy to note that the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, by resolution 49/75 K, requested the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. This will give an impetus to the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.

These considerations provide a sound rationale to conclude an international convention on NSA. For, if nuclear-weapon States continue to put a premium on the security and political value of nuclear weapons, it will only serve to give an added impetus to the threshold States to go nuclear. It is only by carrying forward the process of the negation of the role of nuclear weapons and by implementing nuclear disarmament measures that nuclear-weapon States can advance the long-term interests of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And it is in this conceptual framework that the question of NSA should be viewed. Many countries have presented the suggestion for a United Nations Security Council resolution, encompassing both NSA and positive security assurances. We feel that such a resolution can constitute a helpful initial step, provided that it is crafted in such a way as to create an international legal norm, outlawing the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States in a comprehensive manner. Myanmar takes the view, however, that even if such a Security Council resolution comes to pass, there remains a need to conclude a legally binding international

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

convention on NSA. Accordingly, we encourage all efforts to achieve progress in this crucial area with a view to early conclusion of such a convention.

In this connection, a draft protocol to the NPT on security assurances, contained in document CD/1277 dated 6 September 1994, tabled in the CD last year by some 12 countries including Myanmar, can constitute a positive basis for the elaboration of an international legal instrument on security assurances. My delegation takes a flexible stance, and we feel that such a legal instrument may be in any format - a convention or a treaty, not necessarily a protocol to the NPT - so long as it has legally binding force.

The question of expansion of membership of the CD remains unresolved. We all agree that there is a need for expanding the membership to include new members, reflecting new realities of the present. My delegation wishes to reaffirm its view that expansion of the CD can be achieved on the basis of the list of 23 new member States, as proposed by the then Special Coordinator for this question, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia. We should endeavour to overcome the current impasse on this question. As far as my delegation is concerned, we can agree to the formula of taking the decision now, and having actual membership of new members take effect at a later opportune date, as an interim measure, if that also be acceptable to other members of the CD.

The current year is considered by many as being significant for the historic anniversaries I referred to earlier on, and also in terms of its critical importance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It brings us new challenges and opportunities. It is in our collective interest to renew our determination and commitment, and to redouble our efforts to make speedy and substantive progress in the CD, particularly in the areas of CTBT, NSA and a ban on fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive purposes. By so doing, we shall be able to meet the challenges and to seize the opportunities offered by this year 1995.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I do not have any other speakers on my list for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, please allow me, through you, to express my thanks on behalf of the Western Group to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for showing once more the interest in the work of the Conference on Disarmament by conveying the message as read out earlier by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky. We have listened attentively to this message, which is a clear expression of the Women's League's concern for international peace and security. The records of the Conference on Disarmament show that this body takes its task, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament agreements, very seriously. The intensive way in which negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty have resumed this 1995 session is only one proof of this. I would like to thank the Women's League once again for the interest they are showing in our work. The Conference will feel encouraged by it in the fulfilment of its important responsibilities.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): We have listened with great attention to the message read out to the CD from the participants at the International Women's Day. We thank the women for their message, which, as you said yourself, Mr. President, has become a well-established practice. It is always very interesting to be kept informed of the views of the Women's Day participants on disarmament issues and their views can also be of help in our work. I am particularly pleased to note that Women's Day this year pays a special tribute to my compatriot, the late Inga Thorsson, who devoted her life to work for peace. She was also for many years a prominent representative in this body. As a politician, Inga Thorsson made many achievements; one of the most important ones was probably that she played a decisive role in the decision of the Swedish Government in 1968 to forgo for all time the nuclear option.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement on behalf of our Group of 21 to welcome the presence of the representatives of the 1995 women's gathering to observe International Women's Day. The members of the Group of 21 express their appreciation to NGO communities through the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for the important message addressed to the Conference on Disarmament and for their valuable contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament. It is encouraging to note that this year's meeting is focusing on international security as it relates to environment, development, international relations and disarmament. The members of the Group of 21 would like to wish them every success in their noble endeavour at the international women's gathering and the Group extends its warm greetings to them on the celebration of International Women's Day.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I join previous speakers in thanking the Women's League for the interest that they have consistently taken in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for the message that they have sent us on International Women's Day this year. Women, Sir, have a particular status in our negotiations. They constitute, as we know, half of the population of the world and while they are the least involved in wars and conflicts, they invariably and increasingly now bear the brunt of the consequences of these wars and these conflicts. We are, therefore, deeply appreciative to them for bringing us a message of peace and light which we hope will shine as a beacon before us in our task.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Kamal. We share your feelings.

Mr. HU (China) (translated from Chinese): The 8 March International Women's Day is just around the corner. Today, the representatives of certain international women's organizations have come here to sit in our Conference. The Chinese delegation would like to extend a welcome to them.

Issues of arms control and disarmament are important matters affecting the peace, security and development of the peoples of the world. Today, when the world is undergoing colossal changes, international disarmament efforts have made certain headway but heavy and difficult tasks, grave and numerous challenges still lie ahead. It goes without saying that the cause of disarmament in the future will be even more important and arduous. For this

(Mr. Hu, China)

reason, it requires more than ever the common effort of the international community, including women. Many international and national NGOs, including women's organizations, have made many contributions in this respect. They deserve our warm tribute.

This September, over 30,000 women representatives from different walks of life in more than 100 countries and various regions will gather in China's capital, Beijing, for the holding of the Fourth World Conference on Women. China at present is coordinating with the United Nations in order to do a good job in preparing for this Conference. We wish the Conference every success in realizing its goal of equality, development and peace. Its success will undoubtedly provide a new incentive and new momentum to our work of disarmament and arms control.

I would like to take this opportunity to offer in advance my congratulations to our female colleagues of all delegations, the ladies sitting in the public gallery and the female staff members of the secretariat.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): As the Coordinator of the Eastern European Group for this month, I too would like to thank the representatives of the international non-governmental women's organizations wholeheartedly for the statement made on their behalf at today's meeting. This statement contains many important ideas which, we are certain, provide the members of the Conference on Disarmament with food for thought and have much in common with the positions of the States of the Eastern European Group. I should also, on behalf of the Group, like to congratulate the representatives of women's organizations and all women present in this room on the forthcoming International Women's Day, 8 March, and wish them further success.

Mr. BENDJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I find myself here in your midst in the Conference on Disarmament for the first time, I wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for your welcome and for the kind words you were good enough to address to me. I am convinced that on the part of all my colleagues I shall find a spirit of cooperation in the pursuit of the objectives of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to reaffirm the complete readiness of my delegation to work with you and with all the other colleagues for the strengthening of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the area of disarmament. Finally, I should like to convey my greetings to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, and to wish them and yourself every success in your task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and welcome to this forum. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor? None do. On behalf of the entire Conference, I should like to thank the representatives of the women's associations present here and to say to them that this morning we have had a few additional rays of light thanks to the

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

extension of the NPT is not a mandate for the nuclear Powers to possess nuclear arms forever but, on the contrary, a guarantee of the irreversibility of the process of nuclear disarmament, stability and security in the world.

In his speech at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin pointed out that our country is in favour of marking the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in a worthy way with the signing of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We believe that all the conditions are ripe for this purpose. In our opinion, we have reached a stage in the negotiations where we can secure consensus on the main elements of the treaty. First of all this relates to the first article of the CTBT, concerning the scope of the ban. Our starting-point is that in drafting the provisions regarding the scope of the treaty we should rely on the language of article I of the 1963 Moscow partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty, with the addition, of course, of a ban on underground tests. The Moscow Treaty has proved its effectiveness, and there are no grounds for changing time-tested language for the scope of the prohibitions. At the same time we must say frankly that proposals to ban preparatory activities for nuclear tests, or computer simulations, for example, cannot secure consensus support, principally because it would be impossible to monitor the implementation of such bans, and therefore only hinder progress on this issue.

Russia favours a treaty of unlimited duration. In this connection we appreciate the fact that the United States of America has dropped the proposal it made last year concerning "simplified" withdrawal from the treaty 10 years after its entry into force. An important achievement of the CTBT negotiations is the fact that in the Conference on Disarmament the positions of States on the international monitoring system (IMS) are drawing closer together. The main element of Russia's approach to that system is the need to combine effectiveness with reasonable sufficiency, especially from the point of view of financial outlays. The timely creation and proper functioning of an international system for verifying compliance with a CTBT essentially depend on the solution found to the problem of covering the expenditure involved. This will determine the ability and readiness of States to adopt and use the IMS, in other words the comprehensiveness and reliability of the verification regime. Russia's position on this issue, which is close to that of a number of other countries, is that future expenses, including the costs associated with the creation of new stations and other elements and the modernization of existing ones related to both the IMS and on-site inspections should be funded by the States parties through the organization in accordance with the United Nations scale of contributions. This approach would be in keeping with the principle of fair distribution and would increase the interest of the States parties in the timely establishment and effective functioning of the international verification system.

Another facet of the problem of funding concerns the state of readiness of the international monitoring system when the treaty enters into force. This calls for the allocation of funds in advance, and as experience shows, it will not be an easy task. Its solution could be facilitated by using an evolutionary approach to the establishment of the international monitoring system, with the initial version being established at a reasonable acceptable minimum based on existing technical means.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

On-site inspections are of great importance in verification of compliance with the CTBT. We proceed from the position that States parties concerned about a suspicious event may use all available means to clarify the situation without any restriction on the right to request at any time an inspection on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any other State party or in an area located outside the jurisdiction of any State. As we see it, the request for an inspection should be examined by the executive council of the future treaty organization as rapidly as possible. A decision to conduct an inspection should be adopted by the executive council by a majority of no less than two thirds. This procedure would practically eliminate the issue of possible abuse of the inspections.

In our view the first stage of the inspection should be of limited duration, for example up to 40 days. This would make it possible, in cases where a suspicious event has occurred, to narrow down the area of search, pinpoint the event that has caused concern and obtain the data necessary to take decisions on further action, possibly including drilling and sample-taking. Such a decision, once confirmed by the executive council, would make the transition to the second stage, including drilling. Both stages should be funded by the organization. This approach seems to us to be the most rational and efficient, making it possible to determine the nature of the suspicious event very rapidly. In this way the problem of disparities in the financial capacities of the participants will vanish.

Russia consistently favours the launching of multilateral negotiations in the CD for the drafting of an agreement on a monitored ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. We proceed from the position that a multilateral agreement of this nature should include not only all nuclear States but also other countries that possess relevant installations for the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Russia considers that the agreement should ban the future production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes. We regard the IAEA safeguards system as the central instrument for the verification of the future agreement. However, there is a major problem here, and this is the high potential cost of verification in the nuclear countries, as well as its technical complexity. It is important to think through and discuss how to apply the IAEA safeguards in a way which is not only as effective as possible but also cost-effective and affordable for the international community. The Russian delegation hopes that the Special Coordinator, Canadian Ambassador G. Shannon, will succeed in achieving consensus on the mandate of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the provisions of the resolution of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was adopted without a vote, and that the ad hoc committee will start working before the end of this part of the CD session. We believe that those who are trying to revise the consensus reached within the United Nations bear responsibility for blocking progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in this important area and are hindering the practical implementation of the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

We are deeply convinced that the prompt conclusion of arrangements providing for reliable security assurances for the non-nuclear States parties to the NPT would be in the interests of strengthening international security

(The President)

words they were kind enough to address to us in their message. We are all very grateful to them and we would like this visit, which has become a very valuable tradition for the Conference, to become a regular one.

(continued in English)

The secretariat, at my request, has circulated a revised tentative timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I consider that this revised timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before suspending this plenary meeting, I should like to remind you that we will be holding, in five minutes time, an informal meeting which will be limited to the presence of members of the Conference only.

The meeting was suspended at 11.15 a.m. and resumed at 1.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 698th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

We shall first take up, and formalize, the agreement reached at the informal meeting concerning the request from Viet Nam to participate in the work of the Conference during 1995. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite Viet Nam to participate in its work during 1995?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 February 1995, at 10 a.m. I would like to inform you that the next plenary meeting will be followed by a meeting to be chaired by Ambassador Kamal to hear his thoughts for the 1995 session on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. If there are no other requests for the floor, I will adjourn this plenary meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.698/Corr.1
7 March 1995

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 16 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

Corrigendum

Page 8, line 24

Between the second and third full paragraphs insert

On the NPT, nuclear-weapon States and some others are recommending indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Many others, including my own, in the present situation, do not share this view. My delegation feels that the choice is not simply between an indefinite extension and an extension for a limited period. There exists a middle option between the two. Given the fact that all States parties desire to see the NPT endure and grow stronger, the third option of extension for reasonable and credible periods with a review and automatic renewal mechanism, and with the possibility of stopping the treaty, if the majority of States parties so decide, is an option worthy of serious consideration. Such an option will also be consistent with the provisions in article X, paragraph 2 of the NPT. It would be constructive to work on a modified version of this third option by building into it an appropriate review, automatic renewal and termination mechanism. My delegation will pursue this matter further at the NPT review and extension Conference, to work together with like-minded countries for an appropriate mechanism for this option. I must, however, add that an extensive review of the implementation of the Treaty and progress in crucial areas such as the CTBT and security assurances should precede decisions at the Conference on the extension of the Treaty.

- - - - -

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.699
23 February 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 February 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alessandro Vattani (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 699th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina and the Russian Federation. However, before giving them the floor, I should like, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to extend a warm welcome to the newly appointed heads of the delegations of Japan, Ambassador Hisani Kurokuchi, and China, Ambassador Sha Zukang, who are both with us for the first time today. I should like to take this opportunity to assure them of our full cooperation in the discharge of their responsibilities.

I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr President, I would like to convey to you my sincere congratulations for the determination and impartiality with which you have guided our work throughout this complex period of your term of office as President on the Conference on Disarmament, and, accordingly, to reaffirm our delegation's willingness to persevere in the difficult task confronting us. I also wish to welcome the presence of the new representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokuchi, and the new representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Since the restoration of democracy in our country, Argentina has adopted a clear and committed position on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have opted for transparency and reliability, discarding other approaches whose real effects were reflected in less security for the region and for the world and the risk of technological isolation for our own country. In this context, President Carlos Menem announced in December 1993 that Argentina would become a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), before the 1995 review and extension Conference. On 10 February 1995, just a few days ago, we deposited the instrument of ratification with the Government of the United States of America, thus keeping that promise after completing all the domestic constitutional requirements. The NPT is the only non-proliferation agreement of worldwide scope and, as such, forms the main international political and legal barrier to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. As such, it has helped to isolate those countries which, within or outside its area of operation, have persisted in trying to acquire nuclear weapons. It is the only multilateral arms control agreement that binds its parties to pursue measures of disarmament, and provides a framework and firm foundation for such efforts. It strikes a balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and in no way legitimizes the permanent possession of such weapons.

On a matter of very close concern to my country, let me affirm that the NPT is an essential instrument in support of the world system for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy - subject, of course, to effective international safeguards. In this connection we have in mind the obligation of the States parties to the NPT to sign full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency - agreements which we regard as an important security assurance for all our countries - and the no

700 3 99A

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

less important fact that the validity of those agreements is linked to the validity of the Treaty. In this area we consider it necessary to strengthen the system of safeguards in order to adapt it to present-day requirements. In that connection, I need only mention that the comprehensive safeguards agreement in force between Argentina and Brazil, ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and IAEA is regarded by IAEA as more comprehensive than those so far signed directly by parties to the NPT. We consider it essential for the forthcoming review and extension Conference to reaffirm that agreements on full-scope safeguards are a vital prerequisite for any supply of nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear-weapon States. We hold that the transfer of advanced technologies with military applications should be properly protected and guaranteed through the existing systems of control and exchange of information. We therefore abide, in our threefold capacity as a new party, as an exporter and as a developer of nuclear technology and materials, by the directives of the export control systems as a prerequisite for world peace and stability.

As Ambassador Marín Bosch said in his statement on 31 January, what is accomplished - or not accomplished - in New York at the forthcoming meeting to review the NPT will "shape or reshape the manner in which the international community approaches nuclear non-proliferation". What is more, it will either facilitate or not facilitate the continuation of the process of nuclear weapons destruction already undertaken by the nuclear Powers. Such weapons, fortunately, are in few hands, and there is no doubt that their presence contributed to the fact that the cold war ultimately ended without bloodshed and with the result desired by those who love peace and democracy. We believe that the NPT has played a supremely important part in this process of limiting proliferation, at any rate so far as the number of nuclear countries is concerned. To deprive ourselves of this instrument now for reasons having to do with perception of the future evolution of the world political situation, or with imbalances that would not even be redressed by terminating the instrument, would mean inviting risks which seem to us immeasurably greater than the problems such a step would allegedly solve. Argentina will therefore come to the review and extension Conference with two overriding objectives: to call for its indefinite and unconditional extension and to seek to improve and strengthen its system of verification. At the same time we think that the most important of all nuclear disarmament measures in the present circumstances is a comprehensive test-ban treaty (our CTBT). Let us therefore ensure non-proliferation once and for all by extending the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally, and let us continue to work for disarmament, moving forward in the negotiation of the CTBT and encouraging the nuclear Powers to continue, to the extent permitted by the development of the international political situation, the process of destroying existing nuclear weapons. Let us work seriously for an international convention prohibiting the future production of fissile materials for military purposes, and let us see how and when the problem of existing stocks can reasonably be tackled. Let us work for the development of security assurances. Although we do not think that we have reached the hoped-for goals in this matter, we do believe that a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council might give rise to a rule prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices against non-nuclear-weapon States, which would be provided with a legally binding and verifiable undertaking on

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

non-proliferation. We shall thus consolidate the current process of disarmament, which is demonstrating the possibility of reversing the armaments spiral in a far shorter time than the nuclear arsenals took to develop.

This year we shall have our only opportunity to make the NPT a permanent part of the international security system. We are confident that we shall succeed in extending it indefinitely, in the realization that any other extension in the future could be arrived at only by amending the Treaty - something very difficult if not impossible in this field to achieve in the prevailing international political circumstances. The extension of the NPT in 1995 is a decision with tremendous consequences for international security and for our own security as non-nuclear-weapon States. If the future of the NPT were uncertain, that would lead us to the collapse of the only legal and political barrier to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I wish now to refer to the work of this Conference on Disarmament. We regret that, as we near the end of February, we have been able to decide on the establishment of only a single ad hoc committee, albeit one of the greatest importance since it concerns the CTBT. This, as I said on a previous occasion, is very difficult to justify inasmuch as it affects the work of this Conference. We do not doubt the importance of continuing negotiations on outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. This last is the very point to which I would like to refer briefly once more. We all know that the search for greater transparency in international relations cannot be limited to the field of weapons of mass destruction or related technologies. Conventional weapons, which are those actually used in regional conflicts nowadays, should also be the subject of measures to afford transparency in this very complex and delicate field. In the course of 1994 we had new working papers before us. Several proposals were made which we consider interesting, such as the British proposal on the volume and organization of armed forces, the Italian proposal on declaration of the closure or conversion of military equipment installations, the proposals by Japan and New Zealand concerning regional transparency and transparency in the sphere of controls on exports of conventional military equipment and technologies. Other important topics also arose in the course of discussion, such as international guidelines for transfers of conventional weapons, and national means of production. As we see it, several of these topics could not be tackled in sufficient depth.

My country firmly believes that transparency in conventional weapons is a subject that the Conference should continue to study. Although there are agreements in force, and others in the process of negotiation, to control or eliminate weapons of mass destruction, there is no comparable process for conventional weapons. We need to know openly what the difficulties are in this field. We do not believe that there is any valid reason for evading the issue; on the contrary, we have important reasons for tackling it positively. Transparency is vital in building confidence and helps to restrain the destabilizing and excessive stockpiling of conventional armaments: an objective of benefit to all regions of the world. It also strengthens international peace and security, contributes to preventive diplomacy and forms the basis of cooperative security. We know very well that the purchase of conventional weapons consumes more resources in the developing world than

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

programmes for mass destruction of weapons. These are resources which, given adequate measures of transparency, could be rechannelled into the economic and social area.

We have repeated several times that my country and the geographical region to which it belongs set a high value on this integrated process of transparency. Transparency and confidence-building measures go hand in hand and lay the indispensable foundation on which to face up fairly and squarely to the requirements imposed by the pursuit of processes of cooperation and integration. What is more, in the case of Argentina the measures developed with our neighbours at the regional level and the development of our thinking on security have enabled us to pass on 5 January last Act No. 24,429 on "voluntary" military service, replacing the former call-up system which was strictly compulsory. This transformation is based on the increasingly technical character of our armed forces in a context of stringent budgetary austerity. This has not prevented Argentina from making a sizeable contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations; it is at present the Latin American country taking the greatest part in operations of this kind.

The Conference on Disarmament affords an ideal opportunity to negotiate practical, realistic and useful measures on this subject. It can make contributions to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and we should bear in mind that the measures devised and developed in this forum may be of worldwide and regional scope. Let us hope that in 1995 the CD will be able to build confidence and security between States in this field by taking up this topic with the responsibility and seriousness it requires.

Lastly, I wish to mention a subject that Argentina considers to be a matter of justice. I refer to the possible participation of Slovakia as a full member of the Conference to fill the vacancy left by Czechoslovakia two years ago. We all know that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic agreed on their separation in a peaceful and civilized manner and in the same way agreed which of them was to succeed to membership of this Conference. All member and non-member States were informed of this situation in 1993 through notes from both countries, which are also Members of the United Nations. I believe we have all had enough time to study the case and that there is no justification for delaying any further this decision to include the Slovak Republic among the members of the Conference. Argentina considers that the Slovak Republic should succeed to the vacancy left by Czechoslovakia. This is the result of an equation involving elements of politics, law and fairness, in view of the agreement reached by the countries concerned.

Although this is a different matter from the foregoing, I would not wish to fail to mention the expansion of this Conference on Disarmament. We give our support to the idea of making new and serious efforts to expand the membership of this Conference, taking into account the terms of United Nations resolution 49/77 B, which was adopted by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament needs to keep up with the times in order to ensure that its work is carried out within a group of States representative of the moment of history we are living in and of the present international context. That is

(Mr. Sánchez Arnau, Argentina)

the best way to ensure that the international community will continue to adopt, and to promote universal accession to, the agreements which result from the efforts and negotiations of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you, as the Ambassador of Italy, with which my country enjoys friendly relations, on the success of your work in the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. We highly appreciate your efforts, which have allowed the Conference, under your leadership, to solve the main task it was facing, that is, resumption of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty. I also express my appreciation to the previous President of the CD, the Ambassador of Iran, Mr. Nasser, for his efforts in the post of President of the Conference. I am also happy to welcome among us the Ambassadors of China, the Netherlands, Japan, Morocco, Myanmar, Indonesia and Brazil, who have recently arrived in Geneva, and to wish them success in their new endeavour.

In the view of the Russian delegation, one cannot but recognize that the main positive aspect of the new post-confrontation era has been a substantial reduction of the nuclear threat that used to be a "sword of Damocles" hanging over our planet. Thanks to a series of agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear armaments reached between the former USSR, and later Russia, and the United States of America, the nuclear arms race was actually stopped and even reversed and - I weigh my words fully as I say this - no longer exists. Thus the commitment assumed by the States parties to the NPT in article VI, relating to "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date", has been fulfilled. Specifically, within the framework of the projected reductions under the START I Treaty, as well as in accordance with the unilateral initiatives for the reduction of nuclear weapons announced in October 1991 and January 1992, the Russian Federation has eliminated more than 1,500 ICBMs and SLBMs and about 400 silo-based and rail-based ICBM launchers and has decommissioned from the Navy more than 15 atomic submarines with SLBM launchers. All heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons have been taken out of combat service, and some of them have already been eliminated. In accordance with the INF Treaty, two classes of nuclear missiles - medium-range and shorter-range missiles - have already been eliminated. All tactical nuclear warheads previously deployed outside Russia have been repatriated and their destruction has begun. All tactical weapons have been removed from Navy ships, submarines and aviation. Production of nuclear warheads for ground-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells and mines has completely stopped. We are determined to continue, together with other nuclear Powers, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing security, and to move in the direction of the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world, as provided for by United Nations decisions and stipulated in Russian military doctrine. We welcome the message of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. B. Boutros-Ghali, addressed to the Conference on Disarmament, and especially his call for "maintaining and even increasing the momentum created by the recent positive

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

developments in the field of arms regulation and disarmament". Indeed, such developments as the long-awaited accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear State, as well as the ratification by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus of the START I Treaty, enabled that Treaty to enter into force. As a result, new, substantial reductions of the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States are becoming a reality. We also endorse the wish expressed in the message of the United Nations Secretary-General that other nuclear Powers will also become actively involved in the nuclear disarmament process, thus making their contribution to the establishment of a safer world.

Experience shows that the method of resolving problems related to nuclear weapons through bilateral agreements, very important though they may be, is effective only up to a certain limit. The inter-related character of nuclear problems calls for an integrated approach. It is these very considerations that led the Russian President to propose at the United Nations that the five nuclear States should draw up a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability. The merit of such a treaty would reside in the fact that its subject would be the most important link in the nuclear chain - the materials and technology on which nuclear weapons rest. Of course, the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear Powers are now different in size. This is why the projected measures could be implemented in stages, taking into account the specific characteristics of the nuclear potentials of particular countries, and allowing for their different obligations. During the first stages, while Russia and the United States would agree on further steps to reduce their nuclear forces, other nuclear States could undertake not to increase their existing nuclear armaments. It is also important that the treaty should contain a commitment on the part of all its parties not to put into service new kinds of strategic weapons that do not exist in their current arsenals.

The 1995 NPT review and extension Conference scheduled for April-May is one of the major international events of this decade. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a time-tested document that has made a most important contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the preservation of stability and the creation of the necessary conditions for radical measures in the field of disarmament. The world is interdependent. The nuclear domain is no exception. It would be difficult to implement disarmament measures without the stability afforded by the Treaty. At the same time, genuine measures in pursuance of article VI, of which a good many have been adopted, especially with the end of the cold war, by my country among others, in turn enhance the strength of the Treaty. The steady growth in the number of parties to the Treaty during recent years confirms that the international community considers the Treaty as one that indisputably corresponds to its interests. Today, this is the treaty with the largest number of parties of all agreements in the field of arms limitation and reduction, its coverage coming close to that of the United Nations Charter. We hope that the NPT will become a truly universal Treaty.

Taking into account all these considerations Russia has made its choice and firmly favours the unlimited and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty at the April Conference. We call upon all countries to adopt the same stance and support action to make the NPT a treaty of unlimited duration. We are convinced that the unlimited and unconditional

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

and strategic stability and the further enhancement of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. I would like to recall that in its military doctrine, approved by President B.N. Yeltsin in a decree, Russia declared its obligations regarding security assurances. The appropriate provision of the military doctrine reads as follows:

"The Russian Federation will not use its nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, except in the event of: (a) an armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops or its allies by such a State that is linked by an alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; (b) joint actions by such a State together with a nuclear-weapon State in conducting or supporting an incursion or armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops or its allies."

Russia is also in favour of extending more precise "positive" security assurances to the non-nuclear States parties to the NPT, providing for appropriate assistance from the United Nations Security Council if they fall victim to a nuclear attack or blackmail. This inspired the Russian President's proposal for a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council at Foreign Minister level in order to agree on an updated Security Council resolution elaborating on the provisions of the well-known resolution 255 of 1968. Russia is also ready to work actively on the enhancement of assurances to non-nuclear States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them - what are known as negative assurances. This relates in particular both to the drawing up of an international convention and to efforts to agree on a formula common to all nuclear States and containing such assurances which could be confirmed in an appropriate resolution of the United Nations Security Council. In our opinion the consultations being held among the five nuclear States are of particular importance for the success of this exercise. For its part, the Russian delegation is doing whatever is necessary to ensure that these consultations culminate in a tangible result.

The renewal of full-scale negotiations on a CTBT during the 1995 CD session should in no way distract us from a still unresolved issue - the re-establishment of the ad hoc committees on security assurances, transparency in armaments and prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Russian delegation favours the re-establishment of all the ad hoc committees that functioned last year as soon as possible so that they can pursue their activities. We do not share the approach of those who try to link all these issues within one package, and we believe that work on each of these topics is in itself worthy of support.

It is a matter of regret that the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament is still unresolved. We are ready to support any decision that would lead to an increase in the number of participants in the Conference through the admission of those that have submitted applications. The consensus resolution of the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly could be a basis for such a decision. We also favour the prompt appointment of a special coordinator on this issue,

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

with due consideration of course to the principles of rotation and balance in the distribution of elected posts in the Conference among the different groups of States. In our opinion the future special coordinator should have a broad mandate and should not be constrained by former proposals and approaches, which, however attractive they seemed when they were tabled, have not been able to pull the membership expansion issue out of deadlock. We do not believe that it is absolutely necessary to stick to schemes that do not yield a practical result. This also applies to the "package" approach to the solution of this issue. In this context I would like to stress that, as we declared earlier, the issue of the admission of the Slovak Republic to CD membership is not related to the problem of expansion of the membership and is a separate and special case. We do not see any obstacle to the Slovak Republic's occupying as soon as possible, as agreed with the Czech Republic, the seat which formerly belonged to Czechoslovakia in the Conference on Disarmament, and we call on all the participants in the Conference to support a decision to that effect.

Practical results of the Conference are expected in the field of disarmament and arms control in order to safeguard international stability and security. It is towards that very objective that the Russian delegation intends to direct its efforts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today.

I now draw your attention to the informal paper containing the tentative timetable of meetings for the Conference for next week, which was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. I give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) (translated from French): I wish to make a brief statement on the calendar of meetings for next week. Would you allow me to do this now, Mr. President, as it is a rather important matter? Thank you.

Mr. President, you have had an informal paper distributed containing the timetable of meetings for next week. This timetable indicates that three meetings of the Conference are scheduled on Thursday, 2 March. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this date coincides with Id Al-Fitr, which brings to a close the holy month of Ramadan for all Muslims. In view of the spiritual importance attached to this event by the delegations of Muslim countries and the need to observe the necessary rest, my delegation would like the meetings planned for that date to be rescheduled in the timetable for next week. If it proves necessary, we could for instance hold next week's plenary meeting on Tuesday morning, 28 February.

I would like to point out that this request is based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/221 A, adopted on 23 December 1994. Allow me to quote paragraph 5 of this resolution in English:

(Mr. Zniber, Morocco)

(continued in English)

"[The General Assembly] invites United Nations bodies to avoid holding meetings on 2 March and 9 May 1995, and [also] invites the Secretariat, when drafting future calendars of conferences and meetings, to take these arrangements into account".

The PRESIDENT: I learned of this request this morning. Yesterday, at the Presidential consultations I was not informed about this very important event taking place on Thursday. Personally, I am sensitive to your request but I feel that, as President, I somehow have to listen to what is the indication which comes from the whole Conference. I would like to know if regional coordinators are able to accept this change so as to allow for the plenary to be rescheduled for Tuesday, 28 February as well as the other two working groups during next week. I would like to state that I checked with the secretariat this morning and it seems that in 1993 this request was agreed upon by the Conference, therefore there is a precedent. I would like to know if the coordinators can give an indication now or whether we can eventually ask the coordinators, once they have a position, to indicate to the secretariat so that we can inform the members of the Conference immediately, but I think that even if I am very sensitive to this request, that I am really in the hands of the members of the Conference. Through the regional coordinators and China I think that we can swiftly deal with such a delicate issue, but if the coordinators are capable of answering immediately - remember that there is a favourable precedent in 1993 - I will encourage them to do so at once. I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, as Coordinator of the Western Group, I cannot give you the answer that you would like to hear from me at this moment, but in five minutes' time maybe I could. Therefore, would it not be a good idea to simply suspend the meeting for a few minutes so that we can consult and then come back to this? It would seem to me that this is the most efficient solution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you for your suggestion. I will now suspend the meeting in order to allow group coordinators to quickly get in touch with their members and also China and then in 15 minutes we will get the answer. I repeat that there was a favourable precedent in 1993 and it would be easy to organize the plenary on Tuesday.

The meeting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 11.25 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: I now have some first reactions from some regional coordinators but I will also invite the others to submit the results of their rapid consultations. The information I have to bring to the attention of the Conference is that the Commission on Human Rights is scheduled to meet on Thursday, when an important personality is scheduled to speak. That personality was planning to also come to speak at the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on Thursday morning, and we learned about the request by Morocco only this morning. This is an information that I submit to you because if an organ of the United Nations, that is, the Commission on

(The President)

Human Rights, maintains the meeting on Thursday, if we, as an autonomous body, decide differently when we do have this scheduled visit, it would seem to me that perhaps it would be a little embarrassing. However, I will follow the method that you suggest. If there has not been enough time during the suspension, I am ready to have Presidential consultations this afternoon at 5 p.m. so that between now and then you will have time to consult further and we can check what is the situation of other United Nations bodies here in Geneva. I was really quite taken aback when I heard that there is a meeting scheduled to listen to the Deputy State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, who is due to speak on Thursday at the Commission on Human Rights.

I give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHARAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Of course the Egyptian delegation fully supports what has been said by the delegation of Morocco, that the decision of the General Assembly to avoid holding meetings on two days, 2 March and 9 May, should be respected, and I do believe that it should have been taken into account by the secretariat and not by you personally as President of the Conference. It should normally be taken into account when the schedule of meetings is being prepared. And by the way, the same proposal as has been presented in the Conference on Disarmament will be made in the Commission on Human Rights. It will also be raised today in the Commission on Human Rights and so I hope that you will not let the matter worry you.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Yumjav. May I first ask whether the regional groups have reached some decision so that we may conclude this issue?

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): The Group of 21 fully supports the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Morocco. The CD should not hold meetings next Thursday, 2 March 1995, which coincides with a very important Islamic feast which is the end of the holy month of Ramadan.

The PRESIDENT: Is there any other regional coordinator who wishes to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation is aware that Ramadan is the holy month for Muslims. We wish our Muslim colleagues well. We agree with the suggestion by the delegation of Morocco that corresponding adjustments should be made in our schedule. Any arrangements agreed among the parties concerned will have the endorsement of the Chinese delegation. Even if there are any difficulties, we will try our best to surmount them as far as the Chinese delegation is concerned. At the same time, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the President as well as the representatives of Argentina and Russia for their warm words of welcome addressed to me. The CD as an important multilateral disarmament negotiating forum is currently engaged in very important tasks of negotiation. In the course of fulfilling our joint mission I will cooperate fully with the President as well as other colleagues and hope that I will receive the cooperation and help of everyone at any time.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): The Western Group, of course, as a point of principle, holds the view that the CD is indeed an autonomous body and therefore General Assembly resolutions which could interfere with the work of the Conference are, as far as the Western Group is concerned, not relevant. Having said that, and having listened to the proposal made by the distinguished delegate of Morocco, the second point that I think is the prevailing feeling in the Western Group is that we regret that the proposal has been made a little late because it certainly causes some trouble - maybe not insurmountable trouble - for this Conference, but as you yourself suggested, Mr. President, it is quite inconvenient for those who have scheduled visits to Geneva. The third point that I would like to make is that, if the Conference decides to accept the proposal made by the distinguished delegate of Morocco, then the Western Group will not stand in the way.

The PRESIDENT: Does the Coordinator of the Eastern Group have a position?

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, we agree with the considerations which have just been expressed by the distinguished representative of the Western Group. Unfortunately, I have to inform you that for the reasons which you yourself have mentioned, no consensus has yet been reached in our group on this matter.

The PRESIDENT: Ambassador Zahran, when can we have an indication about the decision taken in the Commission on Human Rights?

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): I think that I am not the spokesman of the Human Rights Commission. There is a bureau there and Morocco, as the current Chairman of OIC, the Islamic Conference, would raise it there as that delegation raised it here. We think that the Conference on Disarmament, notwithstanding what the Western Group said, is a body which was created by SSOD-I, a General Assembly special session, and we think that we have to abide by the conference services of the United Nations. Is there already a resolution adopted to that effect? Yes, it was adopted, it was referred to by the representative of Morocco and we think that the secretariat should have taken care of that in implementation of that resolution. As it is observed here, it should be observed there, in the Commission on Human Rights.

Mr. BABAR (Pakistan): First of all, my delegation fully supports the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Morocco. It is an occasion of great importance to all Muslims around the world. It has the same significance as 25 December, on which we do observe a holiday. I was a little amazed by the remark of the Western Group Coordinator that we are not bound by United Nations General Assembly resolutions. I am amazed because of the selectivity of using this argument. We have heard that in the case of "cut-off", it was a consensus resolution and, therefore, should be accepted by all. Here we have an argument that it is not binding on us; I totally agree it is not binding on us. So my point is that, whatever we do here in the Conference on Disarmament, we should have one principle to abide by. We should not use these arguments selectively, so I would again request that we consider this proposal seriously and we give it a second thought because it would have implications on other things that happen in the CD.

Mr. ECHARIF (Algeria) (translated from French): Obviously my delegation supports the suggestion made by the delegation of Morocco on behalf of the Islamic Group. Now with regard to the reaction of the Western Group, we agree with our colleague from Pakistan that saying that a General Assembly resolution does not commit the Conference on Disarmament is something that is so uncommon and so unusual that at the very least it would be worth highlighting in the report that the Conference on Disarmament will submit to the General Assembly at the end of the year. In that context I would just like to say that my delegation will insist on next Thursday not being a working day.

Mr. WIRANATA-ATMADJA (Indonesia): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to place on record that Indonesia will wholeheartedly support the proposal of Morocco, and at the same time we would like to request you and this body to seriously consider the proposal put forward.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): I am a Catholic; I am not a Muslim, I am a Catholic. I am talking on a point of principle. I think we cannot afford to have an argument over religious issues based on some of the arguments that I have heard here. It is surprising to hear the comment being made that we are the Conference here and, therefore, what the General Assembly does does not bind us. That is a very peculiar argument. Why? Because we here who belong to this Conference represent exactly the same Governments that are Members of the United Nations; there are not two sets of countries belonging to the CD and the General Assembly, so that is not a good argument and I hope we are not going to argue like that. Personally, I think that it was not necessary to have a break to consider this. I think we should have just decided that this is something just like 25 December. Catholics will argue strongly that 25 December be a public holiday and it has always been a public holiday, and those of us here on religious grounds who believe that this day is important should have it. I do not know how many are going to speak on Thursday; there may be two like today, now surely we cannot make this into a big issue. So I would urge that since the Western Group has said that they would have no problem - they have said that - I would call upon you to end the discussion here and just decide that on Thursday we shall not have plenary and that, as requested by Morocco, we have it on Tuesday. There are other more important things to discuss here than belabouring this question.

The PRESIDENT: If the discussion had taken place in my family grounds, I would have solved it very quickly. However, if we look at the global picture, the situation seems to be that somehow - and I have to make it understood - most of us are not familiar with these holidays about which we learned only this morning. I can understand that some delegates who were discussing the difficult problems of the timetable at 9 a.m. this morning, trying to avoid duplication, parallel meetings, etc., are now quite surprised that after having discussed it for one hour, they now have to review all their planning. The second thing is that this resolution is recent, i.e. December 1994, and it clearly states what has already been read out by the delegate of Morocco. I checked with the secretariat and in 1993 the Conference took a favourable decision on such an issue. We gave time to the coordinators to think about this issue with their delegations. We now have a positive attitude of the Group of 21, of China, and an indication from

(The President)

the Western Group that the problem is not insurmountable and a practical solution can certainly be studied. Due to the information formally announced that an important visitor was scheduled to come to Geneva to attend two important functions, I think that it is a matter of courtesy that we allow for the delegation which has a real problem to contact its office and report and tell us with all the elements that he has in his hands. Naturally, we will take into consideration the feelings which have been expressed around the table, and I do not think that it would be advisable to have a table like this in which we have many, many countries not attending. I think it is not in the interest of the CD and probably it is also not in the interest of the personality coming, so I think it is important to take into consideration a fact, a true fact of life. So I really think that if a decision cannot be taken this morning, considering the matter very urgent, I would propose to convene Presidential consultations this afternoon at 5 p.m. so as to come to a clear decision. In the meantime, those delegations which have a real problem due to the scheduling of meetings can naturally contact their capitals. I would suggest this formula which is the normal and correct formula to obtain the opinions of participants to the Conference.

I give the floor to the delegate of Morocco.

Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) (translated from French): I apologize for taking the floor again. Mr. President, you have asked the Conference to take a more or less formal decision on this matter and you intend to organize consultations this afternoon to try to find a solution. In that case will we have to reconvene the Conference in plenary session in order to formalize the decision, which I hope will take account of the arguments put forward in favour of rescheduling the meetings planned for next Thursday? I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that you referred to the decision that was taken last year; that was also a similar situation because it was agreed that a Minister whose visit had been agreed on should speak on a similar date. Despite that, and I was going to say fortunately, a solution was found, and I hope that the same will be true this time.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Is it possible to reach a consensus without waiting for this afternoon? I will make my concluding statement, which will last about 20 minutes, and that should enable the delegation of Hungary to contact its capital in order to ensure that the Deputy State Secretary will be able to address the Conference on Friday 3 March. I give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia.

Mr. OMAR (Ethiopia): Just a point of clarification and information. The Bureau of the Human Rights Commission at the beginning of the session decided not to extend daily meetings beyond 5.30 p.m. At the same time it was also decided not to have meetings on Thursday, which is Id al-Fitr.

The PRESIDENT: This is a very important element for our information. There are no meetings of the Human Rights Commission on Thursday. There is a precedent in 1993 that the secretariat mentioned to me, so I think these are very relevant elements which have to be taken into account. I do not wish to put pressure on anybody - if, after my closing remarks, the delegation or delegations which still need time have the possibility to give an answer, then

(The President)

they give their answer and we can make it formal. If this is not possible, I have no other choice but to hold Presidential consultations at 5 p.m. and, naturally, there will be a gentleman's agreement that whatever will be decided there will be formalized at the next plenary meeting, which could be held on Tuesday. The secretariat suggests that if the Conference agrees now that the results of the Presidential consultations that could take place at 5 p.m. this afternoon - if we do not find a solution before - whatever will be the result, if there is consensus, is going to be somehow the formal schedule that we are going to follow; if the Conference so decides, we have solved our problem. If there is no objection to this method I think that I would follow such a procedure, that is to say, I hope that we shall arrive at a consensus on this matter before the end of this morning's plenary. If the delegations express that they could not give a consensus immediately or at the end of this morning, I have the possibility of Presidential consultations at 5 p.m. But then, if the Conference accepts what is going to be the result of these consultations - i.e. I hope, consensus - this is going to be somehow the schedule approved for next week. That is a way out to give more time to those delegations which have a difficulty. I think that this is the formula, but I can again raise the issue once I have finished with the remaining business. I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. BABAR (Pakistan): Sorry for taking the floor again. I take the floor with respect to the programme of work for next week. Unfortunately, due to the circumstances, my delegation will not be in a position to accept any parallel meetings. We have done that as a compromise, a great compromise, but until we have a solution to 2 March, this has to be kept in abeyance.

The PRESIDENT: The situation is very clear. So, I invite the delegations which have some difficulty to really try to get an answer so as to allow us to reach a conclusion before the end of this formal meeting. I give the floor to the representative of Iran.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Needless to say, my delegation is fully supportive of the proposal by Morocco. I believe it would perhaps be useful to suggest that, when we have had on previous occasions eminent personalities who wished to visit the CD, we have arranged plenary meetings on other days, and particularly on Tuesdays, and therefore the delegation which is concerned with this matter could probably take into account to have a plenary on Tuesday, and I think that will put us in a safer place and on that basis we may be able to achieve consensus easier. What remains is Working Group 2, which for the time being is indicated for Thursday afternoon - we have Friday afternoon open right now according to this programme, so I think we can decide at least for that part of it to transfer the Working Group to Friday afternoon, so the only question that would remain, therefore, would be a final answer from the delegation concerned.

The PRESIDENT: I thank you very much, Ambassador Nasser, for your wise suggestion. I would like now to ask the following. This is really a question where sensitivity is fundamental. I think we have to take into account the real emotions, the real sentiments, the real beliefs of each one of us. This is a very delicate and serious matter in which there is no way that one can be ironic or not sensitive to such an issue. I have a feeling that practically

(The President)

there is a convergence of views, that this is not insurmountable and we can find a solution and the solution which is being indicated, to have the plenary on Tuesday, is one which has been followed many times and that would solve the problem clearly.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): First of all, I wish to express deep appreciation to all those who have expressed the views not to work on the day of the religious holiday. This is an important fact of religious tolerance for which we are all combating here and all over the world; this is an important human right and we want to respect it. The problem arose simply because the information about the possible changes in the timetable of the CD has been announced a little bit late, so that preparations had already been made, but since this is a generally accepted proposal now not to have meetings on 2 March and we have learned, and I guess it is already decided actually, that not even the Human Rights Commission will sit on 2 March. Of course, I cannot speak on behalf of the Eastern European and Eastern Group in general, but what I can say is that we should not put any obstacle in the way of not having the plenary on the originally scheduled day, i.e. on 2 March. If it was possible, we would prefer 3 March because of having to rearrange the plans of the Deputy State Secretary who intended to come and whose speech has already been scheduled for the 2nd in both meetings, in the Human Rights Commission and in the Conference on Disarmament, without any warning that there would be no meeting. So I now leave it up to the secretariat and to the Conference if it is possible to have the meeting on 3 March and we do not insist on having it on the 2nd, both out of respect for the Muslim faith and for the Conference's work, we should have a Conference where all those who are members of the Conference are present and listen to the speech which is intended to be delivered by a high-level Hungarian politician.

Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) (translated from French): I apologize for taking the floor yet again. It was just to say that my delegation very warmly supports the proposal made by Ambassador Boytha that we should hold a plenary meeting on Friday, 3 March, and my delegation will be very happy to hear His Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Hungary who will come to make a statement during that morning.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat, very helpful as always, tells me that it is going to be very feasible to reschedule the plenary meeting so as to take into account the consideration which has been made and to take into due account the request made by the representatives of the Islamic world. I am very thankful because I understand that also the Eastern Group accedes favourably to this request, so that the representative of Morocco would like to tell you that the CD agrees and Thursday is going to be a holiday and we extend our best wishes to all of you of the Islamic faith and we will, together with the secretariat, arrange for a revised version of the timetable of meetings which we are going to circulate. The secretariat informs me that it will be distributed this afternoon.

I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mr. EKWALL (Sweden): Of course the solution which has been proposed is acceptable to my delegation. I would just like to have a confirmation on behalf of my Ambassador, who is the Chairman of Working Group 1 of the NTB Committee. Would the meeting of Working Group 1 on Friday morning follow right after the plenary?

The PRESIDENT: This is an excellent proposal. Working Group 1 will indeed follow after the plenary on Friday, 3 March.

My conclusions are that there is consensus of the Conference. I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): We also have a problem with Working Group 2 of the NTB Committee, but I think we should refer to that in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee. This is one of the problems I referred to earlier that we have to somehow see to.

The PRESIDENT Yes, we shall deal with this together with the secretariat. I had hoped that we would be able to make progress on the pending issues contained in the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session. However, despite all efforts, it appears that further consultations will be needed in order to overcome remaining difficulties. Therefore, it will be up to my successor in this function, Ambassador Kurokuchi of Japan, to pursue these issues and, in this respect, I should like to assure her that I shall be at her entire disposal for any assistance she may require.

As my term of office as President of this Conference will end tomorrow, I should like to take this opportunity of making a few concluding remarks.

(continued in French)

I shall be brief and sincere. My presidency will not go down in the history of the Conference on Disarmament, except perhaps on one point: the fact that my presidency has involved an amendment to the rules of procedure of the Conference. I was granted the honour and the privilege of presiding over the Conference from 1 January, and I therefore had the pleasure of dealing with the problems of the whole Conference for a few extra weeks compared with my predecessors. I had hoped that the fact of having a few extra weeks might have given me an advantage - worries, yes but hope too. Unfortunately the realities of life (as we have just seen, for example, with the timetable for next week) did not enable me to have all the time necessary to consult my colleagues for whom I have what the Romans called a timor reverentialis, a very special respect, in view of the fact that almost all my colleagues all have much greater experience than my own, and probably much greater wisdom than my own.

Most of my colleagues were not in Geneva for a long period, because they were either at the Toronto seminar or in New York for the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This is why I suggested the adoption of a method which I hope was appreciated by the participants and the observers, that is, the organization,

(The President)

side by side with the Presidential consultations (the consultations that all my predecessors have always followed), of an open-ended, informal, frank exchange of views, in order to grasp the concerns, the expectations, the hopes of each of you. I did this with the members and with the observers at the Conference, and as I found this method effective and the machinery for Presidential consultations rather rigid, I thought it was a good idea to open the discussion additionally during informal debates, on top of the plenary sessions. This enabled me, and I hope everybody else too, to gain a better understanding of the positions of each one of us.

What was the result of this method? Of course, everybody may have a different vision of things. We know that a bottle may look half full to one person and half empty to another, but there is no doubt that the essential concern of the entire international community, expressed through United Nations resolutions, the will to continue negotiations rapidly to move towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, that has been achieved; we succeeded during the first week of the session in restarting the negotiations on the treaty. It was also possible, after lengthy, very serious and very thorough discussion (and I am very grateful to the delegations that participated in this discussion), to adopt the agenda for the 1995 session. Naturally, part of the Presidential statement remained on paper, and I want to give you my assessment in this regard, so that at least at the end of this experience you will know what I feel.

I am firmly convinced that the efforts made by Ambassador Shannon, who was urged by all of us to continue his work towards a mandate in order to set up as soon as possible an ad hoc committee on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, will be crowned with success. I know that Ambassador Shannon is continuing his negotiations effectively and we will have specific proposals before us shortly; consequently I think that light is beginning to appear at the end of the tunnel as far as this issue is concerned. Of course, in the Presidential statement I expressed a hope for the speedy establishment of the three ad hoc committees which had already been in operation in 1994. I am convinced that it is essential to re-establish as soon as possible the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with achieving effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. It is not possible to approach such an important meeting as the Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without some progress being made in the field of negative security assurances, but at the same time I am convinced that an ad hoc committee should be established as quickly as possible to discuss, negotiate and make progress on the subject of conventional weapons. I think that, for world public opinion, the Conference on Disarmament may seem like something rather abstract if the weapons which cause blood to be spilt throughout the world somehow have no right to be discussed in this forum. Those who say that it is not possible to move forward along the path of cooperation and collaboration, in order to try to make progress in the area of conventional arms regulation, are not speaking seriously.

Naturally, it is also essential to re-establish the committee on prevention of an arms race in space.

(The President)

I would have liked to re-establish these three ad hoc committees as of the first week with their existing mandates, but it did not prove possible to reach agreement. I hope that my successor will be more fortunate in this area.

The other points I wish to mention have to do with two fundamental aspects for the life of our Conference. One is the expansion of the membership of the Conference. During my term in the Chair, the Italian Government has taken diplomatic steps in several capitals to emphasize the importance of a speedy solution to this issue. It is difficult to believe that the treaty on a nuclear test ban, a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material can be concluded if the problem of the expansion of the Conference has not been solved first. Expansion is a guarantee that the exercise we are engaged in can be concluded with an objective of universality, and that the States which are interested in it (and they have clearly indicated their interest in our work since they have been observers of our work for years and they make a remarkable contribution to our efforts) will play a full part in our negotiations.

The agenda of the Conference is important too and for two sessions we have heard the concerns of the various parties in order to bring it up to date. I hope a special coordinator can work as quickly as possible to submit a progress report to us before the end of the session so as to guide us in our discussions, to be ready to have ideas for a new Conference agenda which can win a consensus approval.

As regards the improved and effective functioning of the Conference I have an announcement to make to you. I have been requested by Ambassador Kamal to inform you officially of the conversation I had with him yesterday afternoon. Ambassador Kamal told me that officially he is going to be leaving Geneva on 16 March and that as a result he will not have an opportunity to pursue his activities as Chairman of those consultations. I have noted his communication and I believe that I am interpreting the feelings of the members of the Conference when I convey our thanks to Ambassador Kamal. I have learned much during the conversations I have had with Ambassador Kamal, particularly during the period last year when he chaired the consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference with wisdom and masterly ability. I am grateful to him. We are witnessing the departure of a leading spirit of this Conference, and it is with a certain sadness that we see Ambassador Kamal leaving this forum. I would request the representative of Pakistan to convey my sentiments to Ambassador Kamal.

Finally, I would like to say that I have addressed myself, in a quite committed way, to the question of the admission of Slovakia as a member of our Conference. It has been said that I have done so with excessive speed; but I am convinced that the case of Slovakia is a very specific question, which raises no legal problems, is not related to the problem of expansion, and is really a case where political morality is sovereign. I experienced great fellow feeling with the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia and our colleague the Ambassador, who were really quite extraordinarily persuasive; they have convinced us that this case should be settled in a positive manner as soon as possible.

(The President)

It now remains for me to thank the Secretary-General, Vladimir Petrovsky, Dr. Abdel Kader Bensmail and all the staff of the secretariat, the interpreters, for their patience. I would also like to mention my predecessor, Ambassador Nasser, who has always cooperated to try to help me to find a way out of difficult situations. He has always done so with good humour, readiness to help, with great savoir faire, and I am grateful to him. I am also grateful to the former representative of China, who helped us during the Presidential consultations, and I reiterate my best wishes to the new representative of China. If, since the first week, we have managed to make progress, to get things moving for the negotiation of the nuclear-test-ban treaty, it was because we benefited from the legacy of Ambassador Marín Bosch. A legacy passed on to Ambassador Dembinski, with the two chairmen of the working groups, Ambassadors Norberg and Ramaker, their "Friends of the Chair" as well as Dr. Peter Marshall, who, with his "tigers", tamed our experts wonderfully so as to produce concrete results.

It remains for me to say that I would have hoped to accomplish what I have done while remaining objective (in so far as a man can be so), tolerant, calm and transparent. I apologize if I did not always succeed in this regard. I would have hoped to leave my successor a less burdensome legacy. I also leave her my best wishes for success, so that we can conclude very quickly what I have not been able to conclude. I thank you all for your patience. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 3 March at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.